

# CURRENT *History*

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE  
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER, 1969

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# CURRENT *History*

FOUNDED IN 1914 BY  
*The New York Times*

PUBLISHED BY  
*Current History, Inc.*

EDITOR, 1943-1955:  
*D. G. Redmond*

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SEPTEMBER, 1969  
VOLUME 57      NUMBER 337

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U.S. Military Commitments in Latin America, June, 1969

U.S. Military Commitments in Europe and the Middle East, July, 1969

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Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila., Pa. 19103. Editorial Office: 12 Old Boston Road, Wilton, Conn. 06897. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, © 1969, by Current History, Inc.

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# CURRENT History

SEPTEMBER, 1969

VOL. 57, NO. 337

*In this issue, seven articles discuss recent events in mainland China. Our first author shows that "The ability to keep together and maintain an organic relationship among the main elements—the party and government machinery, the army, the intelligentsia, and the mass organizations—has been a prerequisite to successful leadership in Communist China. The balance has been delicate, requiring diligent adjustments whenever a new decision was made to take certain major steps in the long and arduous task of national reconstruction."*

## The Chinese Communist Leadership

BY KAI-YU HSU

*Professor of Humanities, San Francisco State College*

WHEN THE WAVE of cheers, like resounding surf, rolled over the huge Heavenly Peace Square in Peking in response to the proclamation that "The People's Republic of China is now established," on October 1, 1949, none realized better than Chairman of the Party's Central Committee Mao Tse-tung, the proclaimer himself, that peace was not yet to reign under all heaven, and that the People's Republic was established in name only. A nation was still to be rebuilt almost from scratch.

These were the odds against Mao: 700 million hungry and war-weary people, a dislocated and primitive economy, a disintegrated and discredited administrative machinery, and political resistance and apathy, silent but stubborn, all over the country. Only two factors were in his favor: the Chinese Communist party after the 1942–1945 reform stood unified behind him, dedicated to the establishment of a new dynasty; and no force, domestic or international, was in sight to interfere directly with the C.C.P.'s effort to remold and rebuild the nation, however painfully slow the process might be.

The Kuomintang of Nationalist Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was out of the picture; the C.C.P. could concentrate on national reconstruction without fearing an invasion from outside. During the last 20 years all that Peking has accomplished should be viewed against its overall concern with the speedy build-up of a new China. The nation has to be rebuilt if it is to survive in the mid-twentieth century, and the process must be speedy enough to head off further domestic deterioration.

To accomplish the mammoth task, Mao needed a popular will, a formula of operation, and enough organization to put the formula into operation. In many ways, the thunderous echo at the Heavenly Peace Square symbolized the popular will. The collective identity of the Chinese people was reestablished and national pride was rapidly boosting a state myth into a glorious state religion. The formula was socialism, interpreted and adapted to suit the changing realistic situation of China. Organization was provided by the C.C.P., which had to be constantly reviewed for organizational effective-

ness. In this discussion, our interest will be focused on the last point to see how the forces of control have been at work in Red China and why there have been repeated realignments.

On the eve of the C.C.P.'s rise to power, the collective life of the Chinese was dominated by the old political parties, a governmental bureaucracy extensive but inefficiently organized and entangled chiefly with the Kuomintang, a military which consisted mainly of warlords and their private armies, and the *hsüeh-chieh*, or teachers and students, extended to include all writers, journalists and other "cultural workers"—hence, intelligentsia. Anyone attempting to organize China had to work with all four of these elements.<sup>1</sup>

It is significant to note that the intelligentsia has been popularly accepted as one of the four main forces molding the society of twentieth century China. The traditional political role of the literati class in China was a factor. The intellectuals, because they could read and write, were more aware of the national situation and its possibilities. They had the leisure to talk and think about Chinese society, and the more energetic intellectuals proceeded to practice their belief in the unity of thought and action. If anyone's destiny were to be changed,<sup>2</sup> the intellectuals had to reshape their own destinies because the old avenues of social advance-

ment had been closed to them. Thus the intellectuals were all potential revolutionaries. They nurtured the first Chinese Communist cells abroad in the 1910's, and they constituted the assembly of the first C.C.P. Congress in 1921 in Shanghai.

But soon the C.C.P. learned a lesson long forecast by Marx and Engels—the petty bourgeois background of the intellectuals denied them the necessary resolve to persevere.<sup>3</sup> They were too nostalgic about their bourgeois past to be dedicated to socialism, too theoretical to know how to adapt the revolutionary process to suit the social reality and, above all, too sentimental to be ruthless. Promptly, the party stressed the fact that its leaders needed to learn from the proletariat; it even tried to bring in some proletarian elements who were not intellectuals. Li Li-san, C.C.P. chief of the early 1930's, was a student turned labor organizer. Hsiang Chung-fa, for a brief period Li Li-san's superior in the party, was only a boatman. But no proletarian survived long in the C.C.P. leadership, and the effective leaders remained the intellectuals, periodically required to study in Moscow or in political schools in China to keep them ideologically alert, or to spend some time working among the workers and peasants to check their bourgeois tendencies.<sup>4</sup>

The party needed muscles which could come only from the military. Cultivation of the cadets in Chiang Kai-shek's military academy produced some of the C.C.P.'s most decorated generals. One of them was Lin Piao, now proclaimed by the new party constitution\* as Mao Tse-tung's heir. When the cultivation of the cadets proved too slow, the C.C.P. took in troops and commanders who had defected from the Kuomintang army. But many members of these ready-made armies were only half-converted to communism and could not free themselves from the warlord mentality which led them to establish (whenever they were successful) private domains of influence in defiance of the central authority. The Long March of 1935–1936 weeded out most of them, leaving only the most committed in the Red

<sup>1</sup> All public rallies in the 1920's and 1930's addressed themselves to the *tang, cheng, chün*, and *hsüeh* circles as the leading groups of society. Much has been written on this background picture. For instance, see Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). See particularly pp. 8–10, 25–31.

<sup>2</sup> The Chinese word for revolution is *ko-ming*, literally, 'change destiny, or change the mandate of heaven.

<sup>3</sup> The problem of the intellectuals in the C.C.P. movement during the period prior to the 1942–1945 reform has been extensively discussed. See *Documents on the Correction of Unorthodox Tendencies* (Yenan: New China Book Co., 1946), in Chinese.

<sup>4</sup> See the chronological development of these ideological remolding campaigns described in Theodore H. E. Chen, *Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

\* *Ed. Note:* For the partial text of this document, see pp. 176 ff.



Army ranks. Still the old specter lurked about. Even such a "meritorious marshal" as Liu Po-ch'eng, the "one-eyed dragon," who led the Red Army across the tortuous grassland of West China during the Long March, and conquered North China for the C.C.P. in 1945-1946, was suspected of backsliding into warlordism when he failed to show up in Peking as summoned during the 1950's.<sup>5</sup> The C.C.P.'s control over the military, therefore, has been maintained because the few top commanders share the party leadership and use the loyal troops to keep watch over troops whose allegiance is less certain.

The party also needed broad mass support which was obtained by infiltrating the hundreds of mass and professional organizations, and by helping the people to form such organizations where there had been none. These organizations were numerous and massive, and their political commitment depended on the C.C.P. cells within them to create and maintain a sense of political involvement. The extensive structure of the People's Political Consultative Conference, a parallel to the National People's Congress, has been developed to provide a direct channel of political communication between the masses on all levels and the government.<sup>6</sup>

The ability to keep together and maintain an organic relationship among these main elements—the party and government machinery, the army, the intelligentsia, and the mass organizations—has been a prerequisite to successful leadership in Communist China. The balance has been delicate, requiring diligent adjustments whenever a new decision was made to take certain major steps in the long and arduous task of national reconstruction. When an adjustment took place, it usually started with a reexamination of the party line and how it could be trans-

lated into action, followed by condemnation of certain errors, and corrective efforts. There would be a wave of reform, starting with the intelligentsia and the party, rippling through the army and the ranks of the masses. Salvation invariably lay with the youth, whose selfless dedication to an idea—while it lasted—continued to provide the sharp cutting edge of the ideological movement. This was the pattern repeated during the 1951-1952 thought reform, the anti-rightist campaign after the "Hundred Flowers" thaw in 1957, the drive to combine political expertise in socialism and technological expertise during the economic recession after 1958, and the anti-Russian revisionism movement intensified in the early 1960's. Each time a few activists emerged from the younger generation, they were promoted closer to the central leadership, which hoped to renew itself gradually. The only factors that have remained constant are the national image, which so far has been Mao Tse-tung, and a cohesive force to keep together the main elements of national control, which so far has been provided by Premier Chou En-lai.

An understanding of this pattern of grouping and regrouping of the collective leadership in Red China should contribute to a clearer perception of the events there in recent years, including the Ninth C.C.P. Congress of April, 1969.

### THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

In 1965, the time had arrived for another shake-up. The exact extent of the failure of the economic reconstruction supposedly heralded by the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the People's Commune movement of 1962 may be disputed, but it is generally admitted that China's industries did not show any promise of overtaking Great Britain's capacity (as had been announced) and even Lin Piao, in his political report during the Ninth Party Congress, claimed no happy progress for the third five year plan, supposedly started in 1966. The C.C.P. had been insisting that on the economic front more could be accomplished with less and faster.<sup>7</sup> When the record refuted its

<sup>5</sup> *Chinese Communist Who's Who* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1967), pp. 614-616 (in Chinese).

<sup>6</sup> Kai-yu Hsu, *Chou En-lai: China's Gray Eminence* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 205-207.

<sup>7</sup> *The Principal Documents of the First Session of the Third National People's Congress, People's Republic of China* (Peking: New China Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 1-4 (in Chinese).

claim, the C.C.P. assigned blame to prevent the populace from losing confidence in the entire leadership. Since the C.C.P. had also been insisting that the masses were never wrong, that the numerous lower-echelon cadres were never wrong, and that the national image of Mao Tse-tung could never be wrong, the C.C.P. had to blame some elements in the party leadership, hopefully on some convincing basis and without damaging the party's momentum too much.

Ideologically, the C.C.P. could not afford risking any further drift to the right toward the post-Khrushchev Russian position that "the C.P. must be a party for all the people," implying that it should take care of the diverse interests of the various groups within the populace—an implication which President Liu Shao-ch'i accepted.<sup>8</sup> The situation encouraged the harder-line policy to reassert itself. Furthermore, the C.C.P. was due for a thorough-going reform. As a dynamic, well unified and effective organization, it had suffered from its rapid expansion from 4.5 million in 1949 to nearly 20 million.<sup>9</sup> There were too many quick conversions, ranging from half-hearted acceptance of communism to sheer opportunism. Many local irregularities, of which the Red Ransom rackets of the early 1950's in South China were a glaring example, were caused by undisciplined and unprincipled elements indiscriminately absorbed into the party when a huge number of functionaries were needed quickly after the 1949 take-over. The move to rejuvenate the socialist move-

ment started by involving the youth. They were to shake up the gathering inertia of a bloated political and government bureaucracy manned by well entrenched elements. But the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution soon became willing tools with which Mao Tse-tung began to revamp the party and the entire government machinery.

The central authority of the C.C.P. became involved. The softer-liners, headed by Liu Shao-ch'i, began to submerge in troubled waters in late 1965, sinking deeper after the widely publicized February Rebellion of 1966 which brought the downfall of P'eng Chen, C.C.P. boss of the Peking area; Lu Ting-yi, C.C.P. propaganda chief; Lo Jui-ch'ing, chief of staff of the armed forces; and Yang Shang-k'un, alternate secretary of the C.C.P. Secretariat, all members of the Central Committee.<sup>10</sup> But the hard-liners were not yet quite ready to go all the way. At the eleventh plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee in August, 1966, the accused "biggest traitor-revisionist in authority, China's Khrushchev," President of the People's Republic of China Liu Shao-ch'i, was dropped from second to eighth position on the party roster. The next most severely criticized leader, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, remained C.C.P.'s secretary-general, and the composition of the Politburo and the Secretariat stayed generally intact.<sup>11</sup>

One after another senior leader joined the ranks of the disgraced. By February, 1968, the reputations of 59 of the 144 active Central Committee members<sup>12</sup> had been more or less severely damaged; their penalties for alleged revisionism or other anti-party activities ranged from demotion to arrest. Twenty-three others were criticized but remained in power. Nineteen, including Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, were never attacked. Only about 20 per cent of the original full strength of the Central Committee was left; there was clearly an urgent need to replenish the leadership with fresh blood.

The C.C.P. proceeded to hold its Ninth Congress with two announced purposes: to review the experience of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and to continue

<sup>8</sup> Ting Ch'u-yuan, "The Many Problems Remaining after the Ninth C.C.P. Congress," *Issues and Studies*, VIII (June 10, 1969), p. 591 (in Chinese).

<sup>9</sup> Theodore Chen (ed.), *The Chinese Communist Regime* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 120-121.

<sup>10</sup> Franz Michael, "Moscow and the Current Chinese Communist Crisis," *Current History*, September, 1967.

<sup>11</sup> Li Tien-min, "Why Does Mao-Lin Faction Rectify the C.C.P. Organization?" *Issues and Studies*, IV (June, 1968), 9, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> Li Ming-hua, "An Analysis of the Incumbent C.C.P. Central Committee Membership," *Issues and Studies*, IV (February, 1968), 5, pp. 13-29. Of the 193 members, 15 had died, 11 were too senile to be active, and 23 had somehow dropped out of public view.

the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.<sup>13</sup> With regard to the first task, Lin Piao's political report (accepted by the Congress) condemned Liu Shao-ch'i only in the most general and therefore rather meaningless terms, confirming his penalty of removal from the party and all party assignments without detailing his crimes. As a result, Liu remains President of the People's Republic of China, a post from which only the People's Congress, not the C.C.P. Congress, can remove him. As to the future of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Piao said that it would continue, more vigorously and thoroughly, until all traces of revisionism had been eliminated. Since any slackening of the effort to build a completely communistic society, any softer attitude toward bourgeois values, and any sign of tolerance of the American type of democracy came under attack during the Cultural Revolution, continuation of the revolution meant a continuation of the class struggle. There may be little class distinction left after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established, but the class distinction in people's minds still has to be combatted.

## PARTY REFORMATION

Actually, the Ninth Congress had only one task—to reform and rebuild the C.C.P. The C.C.P. took one extra week beyond its original schedule to agree on a realigned leadership.<sup>14</sup> The result was an expanded Central Committee consisting of 279 regular and alternate members. Fifty-three members are hold-overs, including the 42 who have weathered the Red Guard storm and

11 of those supposedly disgraced and out of the picture. About one-third of the new committee apparently earned their recognition because of their military service records. The rest of the slots were filled by representatives of mass organizations, including Red Guard units.<sup>15</sup> On the whole, the reorganization of the C.C.P. central leadership appears to have followed the newly adopted party constitution by more or less equally dividing the composition among the experienced C.C.P. leaders, the armed forces and the mass organizations. The 53 hold-overs may be numerically fewer than one-third, but their background and seniority clearly give them more weight. On the other hand, the avowed goal of party reorganization to bring in more fresh blood has been only partially fulfilled. Of the mass organization representatives amounting to about one-third of the committee, a large proportion are alternates, not regular members. And Red Guard leaders are few. This line-up has given rise to speculation about a continuing power struggle between the old and the new factions within the C.C.P.<sup>16</sup>

Two other factors influencing the composition of the Central Committee may very well suggest two more lines of potential struggle for dominance. Of the 279 members, actually about 112 can claim a military background, which could indicate a rise of the military, contending with the non-military partisans. Again, of the 279 members, 170 have distinguished themselves by serving in the provinces; they could be a new clique opposing the Central C.C.P. power unit.<sup>17</sup>

These speculations are not very meaningful because the lines between the C.C.P. cliques have never been too firmly drawn and factionalism has never played a decisive role in C.C.P. politics.<sup>18</sup> Otherwise, Liu Shao-ch'i, long regarded as Mao Tse-tung's staunch supporter, would have had a different political fate, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, personally cultivated by Chou En-lai in France, could have survived together with Chou. Furthermore, very few of the military leaders now in the C.C.P. Central Committee are just soldiers; their background also includes con-

<sup>13</sup> *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong English edition, weekly supplement, May 1-7, 1969), pp. 3-11.

<sup>14</sup> Yao Meng-hsüan, "The C.C.P. Ninth Congress is the Beginning of a New Power Struggle," *Issues and Studies*, VIII (June 10, 1969), 9, p. 596 (in Chinese).

<sup>15</sup> Wan Ta-hung, "Chasm Continues within the C.C.P.," *Issues and Studies*, VIII (June 10, 1969), 9, p. 586 (in Chinese).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 587.

<sup>17</sup> *Ming Pao Weekly*, I (Hong Kong, April 20, 1969), 23, pp. 67; I (May 4, 1969), 25, pp. 6-7; I (May 11, 1969), 26, pp. 6-7.

<sup>18</sup> John Wilson Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 124-125. Kai-yu Hsu, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-227.

siderable political experience. The local leaders, once brought into the central leadership, soon identify themselves with it.

Now that the Ninth Congress has abolished the party secretariat and the post of secretary-general, the innermost circle of the C.C.P. is narrowed down to the Politburo and, better still, the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Until April, 1969, this committee included seven: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yun, Lin Piao, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, arranged in that order. The same order was observed at the top of the Politburo roster and on the roster of the steering committee of the Central Committee.<sup>19</sup> Clearly these were the stalwarts whose hands held the destiny of the C.C.P.

The Ninth Congress reduced the Politburo Standing Committee to five members: Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Ch'en Po-ta, Chou En-lai and K'ang Sheng. That Lin Piao has been elevated to become Mao's immediate successor was recorded in the newly adopted revised party constitution, and the roster merely confirmed that fact. The removal of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing from the list was also expected. But the announcement included a specific note explaining that the listing of Ch'en, Chou and K'ang was arranged according to the number of strokes in the Chinese characters which stand for their last names; therefore the order suggested no relative importance of their party positions.<sup>20</sup> Some observers believe that the notation may have been offered to save face for Chou En-lai, but those familiar with Chou's role in the C.C.P. attach little significance to this theory. The size of the top leadership has been so dras-

tically reduced that each of the remaining five will have to carry a heavier share of responsibility than before. Besides, in years past Chou accepted the fourth or even the fifth position without any embarrassment.

What seems to be significant is that no new faces have been brought into this focal point of C.C.P. power. Ch'en Po-ta, eleventh on the Central Committee roster before April, 1969, has been promoted largely because of his ability to interpret Mao and speak for him. Together, they may be able to compete with the eclipsed theorists, Liu and Teng. Through Lin, Mao hopes to maintain C.C.P. control over the army. Through K'ang, the C.C.P.'s secret service may continue to be a useful arm to safeguard party discipline and unity. That leaves Chou En-lai to deal with the intelligentsia and the mass organizations—a task he has performed with remarkable dexterity and success in the past.<sup>21</sup>

The composition of the new Politburo shows a little more even distribution of representation. Of the 25 members (one less than before), nine are soldiers, six of them more closely associated with Lin Piao himself; eight have emerged from the Cultural Revolution, including five recognized as friends of Mao Tse-tung's wife, Chiang Ch'ing; and seven are identified as Chou En-lai's supporters.<sup>22</sup> Observers who have followed the rise and fall of Liu Shao-ch'i are quick to conclude that if Mao does not die soon, a fight could be shaping up between Mao and Lin Piao in spite of their seemingly close relationship.<sup>23</sup> If that occurs, the only possible peacemaker in the top leadership would be Chou En-lai. So far, Chou seems to continue to retain the

(Continued on page 178)

<sup>19</sup> *The People's Handbook, 1965* (Peking: Ta Kung Pao Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 131–132 (in Chinese).

<sup>20</sup> It is to be noted that the simplified Chinese character for Ch'en has seven strokes, one less than the regular character for Chou.

<sup>21</sup> Kai-yu Hsu, *op. cit.*, pp. 219–224.

<sup>22</sup> Ting Ch'u-yuan, *op. cit.*

<sup>23</sup> All sorts of speculations have been made on the future power struggle within the C.C.P. For example, *The Central Daily News* (international airmail edition) July 3, 1969, p. 1, reports an alleged open split between the Chou En-lai faction and the Mao-Lin group.

Kai-yu Hsu is chairman of the world literature department at San Francisco State College. He completed his graduate work at Stanford University and taught there until 1959. He is the editor of *Twentieth Century Chinese Poetry* (New York: Doubleday, 1964) and the author of *Chou En-lai: China's Gray Eminence* (New York: Doubleday, 1968).



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*"In its Maoist variant, communism in China has become the advocate of permanent asceticism, extolling the virtues of poverty, fearful of the spiritual pitfalls implicit in material advancement."*

## China's Economy: A Balance Sheet after Twenty Years

BY JAN S. PRYBYLA

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MUCH HAS HAPPENED in China since the Communists took power, most of it behind a solid wall of secrecy. The massive outpouring of party gossip during the Cultural Revolution did not simplify the job of getting the facts. The wall posters, pamphlets and tabloids authored by exultant teenagers and factionalized young worker groups are fascinating documents, but hardly the material from which theories are spun or on which policies can be based. The distressing fact is that with all the provincial radio broadcasts, the interviewing of refugees, diplomats, traveling salesmen and assorted tourists, and with all the photographs and microfilms, relatively little is known about what actually is going on in China. One sometimes gets the impression that the Chinese themselves do not know.

There is something to be learned from the absence of meaningful intelligence on the state of the economy, and it is this: China's most pressing problem—and the one most likely to affect the political viability of the regime in the long run—is how to subdue nature, that is, how to feed, clothe, house and keep in good health a population which increases by over 200 million every 15 years. By comparison, Central Committee Chairman Mao Tse-tung's ephemeral deification, his passable poetry and his refinements of the Marxist dialectic pale into insignificance. The most striking fact about the Ninth Na-

tional Party Congress of April, 1969, is not who sat next to Mao on the rostrum but the omission from the agenda of any reference to the great issues of the economy.

If one insists on picking up information from the revealed order of leadership precedence, it may be of interest that there is not a single economist or economic planner in the new Politbureau or on the Standing Committee. The Congress Presidium did have two men associated with economic policy-making (Li Fu-chun in nineteenth place, and Li Hsien-nien in twenty-first), but neither of them made it to the two top ruling bodies. In fact, beyond repeating now and again that everyone must "grasp revolution and promote production," the Congress acted as if the economy did not exist. The cheerful disregard of the country's basic problem came on top of a statistical vacuum and fast on the heels of insistent reports about troubles in industry and transportation. The statistical void may be explained in two ways: one, assuming that the central statistical service still functions, it seems not to be getting the needed flow of data from the production front; two, if such information is forthcoming, it is probably bad news, unfit for publication.

One must, however, beware of exaggeration and sensationalism. Given the antics of the Cultural Revolution, it is indeed surprising that the economy continues to operate at

all. There is certainly no indication of a wholesale, country-wide breakdown, in spite of much official fuming against "economism," that is, the propensity of individuals to make private hay while the sun shines. One possible explanation is that the Cultural Revolution was essentially an urban phenomenon, preoccupied with the "superstructure" of ideas and political power relationships, not with the economic "base." The economic base survived largely by default. One of the more touching side-shows of the Revolution was the good natured going about their business of the masses of peasants, the deft grasping at every little freedom offered them by the confusion and fury at the top. While the leaders looked under the beds for rightists, leftists, capitalist-roaders, spies, saboteurs, counterrevolutionaries and enemies of the people, the people "play poker or mahjong deep into the night. . . . They kill pigs, buy fish, prepare the new year rice cake, arrange days of rest, visit relatives," and generally get their ideological priorities disarmingly mixed up.<sup>1</sup> One former commune production hero had the impudence to say of the Chairman's works: "What's the good of reading that stuff? Why not get more sleep?"<sup>2</sup>

As often before, the cellular character of China's society reasserted itself during a time of dynastic turmoil. Such reassertion enables the economy (and hence the people) to survive, but it makes little or no dent in the problem of feeding the millions, making them a little better off every year. Communism, especially as practiced by Stalin, was obsessed with economics. For all its cruelty, its abuse of power and its disdain for the individual human person, it was, by and large, a modernizing force in Russia. In its Maoist variant, communism in China has become the advocate of permanent asceticism, extolling

the virtues of poverty, fearful of the spiritual pitfalls implicit in material advancement.

The world of Mao is full of fat, slothful, wily demons and monsters preying on the righteous builders of the future. One of the accusations made against Liu Shao-ch'i (Chairman of the Republic) was that he had once said that

the final goal of the Chinese Communist Party . . . is to build up China, ensure that China will be an independent country and a sovereign state, and improve the livelihood of the people. . . . What we mean by improving the livelihood of the people is to improve people's economic life and cultural life in the realization of socialism and communism.

Mao's standard-bearers took this to signify that

in popular language [to improve the people's livelihood] means to enjoy eating, drinking, playing around, and seeking pleasure. This is truly absurd and reactionary! How can there be a Communist society enjoying eating, drinking, playing around, and seeking pleasure?<sup>3</sup>

One could wax metaphysical about this, as some Westerners are prone to do. It may, after all, be asked whether a society which adds the equivalent of the population of the United States to its numbers every 15 years or so is governable at all or, at the very least, whether it can be governed by resort to the known canons of civil rule. Perhaps, some Westerners say, Mao has some sociologico-charismatic gimmick with which to run such a prolific country.

It could as validly be asked whether Mao's thought has atrophied, whether his present behavior is not explainable by reference to the science of geriatrics rather than by an appeal to some new Marxist political economy. If there is such a gimmick, it looks very much like the army, the People's Liberation Army, to be sure, but the military all the same. After 20 years the army has emerged as Communist China's only cohesive social force. And that, one may venture to add, is nothing new in the experience of underdeveloped countries.

There are three broad areas in which the Communists seemed, for a time at least, to have achieved creditable results. These are

<sup>1</sup> Inner Mongolian People's Broadcasting Station, January 23, 1968, and Chekiang People's Broadcasting Station, January 18, 1968, in *China News Analysis*, No. 695, 1968.

<sup>2</sup> Richard Baum, "A Parting of Paupers," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 4, 1968, pp. 17-19.

<sup>3</sup> "Liberation Army Literature and Art," January 25, 1968, in *Union Research Service*, Vol. 50, No. 9, January 30, 1968, p. 126.

public health, education and industry (especially the heavy part of it). There is one area in which their exertions have been more equivocal: agriculture. It is around these four subjects that our balance sheet will be built.

## PUBLIC HEALTH

The Communists turned China into one of the cleanest countries in Asia. That is no mean achievement when it is recalled that in 1952 the production of soap in the country was 21 grams per body, compared to 245 grams in a not overly clean Russia in 1927-1928.<sup>4</sup> The Communists did more than that. They wiped out the "Four Evils" (rats, flies, mosquitoes and grain-eating sparrows) which in most Asian countries devour an important portion of the annual harvest and spread disease. There were mass inoculations; cholera, smallpox, kalaazar, schistosomiasis and the bubonic plague were curbed or banished. Spittoons were sent to the antique stores; pimps, prostitutes, beggars, pickpockets, deviants, hoboes and highwaymen were sent to labor reeducation camps. The campaign against dirt and disease was pushed with the same single-minded determination as the fight against incorrect thought. In the process, the delicate ecological balance was sometimes upset but, all in all, the job was done.

Available figures show [wrote one Peking authority] that in 1952 over 120 million rats were killed. By weight, more than 2 million catties' [1 catty = 1.1023 lb.] weight of flies, mosquitoes, and fleas; and by numbers, another 20,000 million of these insects were exterminated. Some 160 million tons of garbage and dirt were cleared away.<sup>5</sup>

The figures are surprisingly detailed. It may be presumed that a good part of the counting, weighing and carting away was done by intellectuals undergoing thought reform under

the supervision of the masses. The job, however, was done. Free medical service was brought to about 7 million workers in industry out of a 1958 total nonagricultural labor force of 57 million.

Further extension of the system was hampered by the continuing shortage of qualified personnel, in spite of the fact that practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine were drafted into service wherever possible. The medical and general welfare needs of the peasants were supposed to have been taken care of by the collective farms and later by the rural people's communes out of their welfare funds (normally about 10 per cent of the farms' gross income). Labor insurance (sickness, accident, disability, old age, death, maternity care) was extended from 600,000 workers in 1949 to about 14 million in 1958.<sup>6</sup> There was an impressive growth in the number of hospital beds, maternity and child welfare centers, kindergartens, clinics and sanatoria.

Despite this good record, the left-wing faction within the leadership was dissatisfied with the nature and pace of the advance for both practical and ideological reasons. The practical reason was that free medical care and labor insurance very largely benefited industrial workers in urban areas. The peasants were neglected. There was a shortage of doctors and nurses in the countryside (in some part due to the reluctance of medical school graduates to move to the villages); clinical facilities were primitive, few and far between; and in general the collectives (and their successors, the rural people's communes) found it difficult to make the necessary financial contributions toward any kind of acceptable medical system.

The ideological reason for the left's anger was the reluctance of medical schools to speed up the training of physicians on the grounds that medical knowledge could not be acquired by osmosis, that it was highly technical, professional and expensive, and that it demanded strict quality supervision, hence, careful selection of applicants and ruthless weeding out of laggards. The number of graduates from medical schools did rise

<sup>4</sup> Alexander Eckstein, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 20, Table 2.1.

<sup>5</sup> Lião Kai-lung, *From Yenan to Peking* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), p. 172.

<sup>6</sup> State Statistical Bureau, *Ten Great Years* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), pp. 218, 219.

from about 3,000 in 1949 to 5,400 in 1958—but it was clearly not enough when set against the country's needs. The leftists put a class interpretation on the medical schools' argument. They linked the relatively slow rise in medical personnel to a plot hatched jointly by the bourgeois intellectuals in the universities and a "handful of top party persons in authority taking the capitalist road." They saw in the application of stringent professional criteria an attempt to deprive the peasant masses and the working class of the medical attention which was theirs by right.

The left's instinctive anti-intellectualism found just the kind of vent it needed in the issue of comprehensive versus selective medical service. Whenever the reins of power fell into their hands, the leftists forced large numbers of doctors and medical students to settle temporarily or permanently in the countryside, sent top medical teams from the cities traveling through the farms, lowered entrance requirements into medical schools, simplified curricula, and shortened the period of formal study. Political consciousness was put on a par with professional skill. In 1968, according to the *People's Daily*, nurses in the First Medical College at Shanghai performed operations, including brain surgery.<sup>7</sup> In the hospital at Anhui, separate surgery and medicine departments were reportedly abolished, and all doctors were required to do everything—just as Lenin had said Communist men would do.<sup>8</sup>

Students were to learn by doing, including complex operations. A big fuss was made over the people's native genius: physicians trained in Western medicine were compelled to learn from village experts in acupuncture and moxabustion. A campaign was unleashed to replace the "Three Bigs" (big universities, cities, hospitals) with the "Three Smalls" (small schools, towns, clinics). Large numbers of young peasants with three years of primary education and some familiarity with folk medicine were given two-to

three-month cram courses in the basics of Western medical science by medical students doing a stint in the countryside. These "barefoot doctors" were attached to commune clinics while not actually working in the fields.

A rural cooperative medical service was introduced in 1969; each commune member is to pay a very small yearly sum to cover the costs of operating the commune clinic plus a tiny registration fee on each visit to the clinic. The commune contributes about 10 cents per year per person from the common fund, and the state contributes nothing. The cooperative clinics are staffed by barefoot doctors, with an occasional visit by a medical student. From a discussion of the system in the press, it would appear that the so-called "Four Elements" (former landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad elements) are excluded from the system. It is still being debated whether the children of the four elements are to be admitted to membership.

Fantastic results from the new medical regime are being reported by the press. The achievements are attributed to a combination of peasant knowledge, invigorating work in the fields, medical practice and the study of the works of Chairman Mao.

Under the guidance of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung [writes *China Pictorial* in its March, 1969, issue] the Mao Tse-tung's thought medical team of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Unit 3125 treated 105 students of the Fuhshien School for Deaf-Mutes in Liaoning Province, enabling all of them to recover their hearing and speaking faculties. Now everyone of them can cheer: "Long Live Chairman Mao!" and recite quotations from Chairman Mao.

What the press does not say is that the attention currently lavished on public health is due, at least in part, to a drastic lowering of public health standards during the Cultural Revolution and to a partial breakdown of the health services. Travelers in China's larger cities reported that rubbish had been left to pile up in the streets for weeks and that nightsoil collections had been suspended while sanitary workers grasped revolution and

<sup>7</sup> *People's Daily* (*Jen-min Jih-pao*), July 9, 1968, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Anhui People's Broadcasting Station*, December 2, 1968, in *China News Analysis*, No. 738, 1969, p. 5.



Red Guards fought among themselves. There was a spread of communicable diseases and an alarming increase in the incidence of cerebral and spinal meningitis. It is not to be forgotten that the "Asian flu" epidemic which swept the world in 1968 originated on the mainland of China. Harassed physicians have been known to prescribe appropriate passages from the Chairman's works to their patients, out of a spirit of passive resistance rather than faith. This is the second time that the leftists have succeeded in undoing the public health spadework done in earlier years; the first time they interfered was during the Great Leap Forward of 1958–1960.

In sum, the net balance of 20 years' efforts in the field of public health and labor insurance is negative at this stage. Things are better than they were in 1949 at the end of a long civil war and years of foreign conflict. But they appear to be worse than they were in 1957, at the end of China's first five year plan. The official disdain for material rewards militates against the extension and improvement of labor insurance schemes, while the de-emphasis of quality and the adulation of the barefooters' wisdom endangers the long-term prospects of medical care.

## EDUCATION

The right-wing and left-wing leadership factions had never quite agreed on a comprehensive educational policy for China's socialist stage. The right-wing tendency (represented by the bureaucratic, authoritarian party regulars) was to stress basic skills, theoretical knowledge, quality (even at the sacrifice of numbers), professionalism and readiness to learn from more advanced socialist countries, notably from the Soviet Union. Every time it was in the political power saddle (e.g., in 1957 and from 1961 through

<sup>9</sup> In June, 1956, Liu Shao-ch'i reportedly said that "universal education is still not too urgent now; the question now is still higher education and the need for specialists." This was later interpreted by the Maoists as a call for expertise rather than correct Redness. See "Chronology of the Two-Road Struggle on the Educational Front in the Past Seventeen Years," *Chia-yu-ko-ming*, May 6, 1967, in *Chinese Education* (White Plains, N. Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press), Spring 1968, p. 18.

1965) the right trimmed political classes and extended the hand of temporary friendship to intellectuals of bourgeois background and foreign education, if only because it believed that China had need of them and could use them under proper ideological safeguards.<sup>9</sup>

The left wing pressed for universal schooling with a strong political content, emphasized the class composition of the student body (favoring the sons and daughters of poor and lower-middle peasants), promoted five-year primary schools and special vocational courses for the culturally underprivileged but politically elect, and argued for the combination of study and physical labor with emphasis on the latter. It was concerned about the elitist character of secondary and higher education and the concentration on academic excellence which, in its view, favored children of middle class origin and perpetuated Mandarinism in a new guise. As against the right wing's preference for full-time schools, the left urged the establishment of part-work, part-study schools which were to be given output quotas, like ordinary enterprises. The income from the sale of the schools' products was to go toward the support of the institutions, primarily toward the payment of tuition fees.

The right favored specialized research institutes, both basic and applied, staffed by experts; the left was inclined toward mass research by the peasants and workers, primarily applied research rapidly popularized. The result of this lack of agreement on educational philosophy and policy was a zigzag movement reflecting shifts in the power balance at the top. Part-work, part-study schools, for example, were created in large numbers during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) only to be drastically cut back in 1961–1963, and resurrected after 1964. Mass peasant research and massive emulation of the results of peasant innovations reached their peak in 1958–1959 and were relegated to the trash heap of history a year later.

There is, of course, much to be said on both sides of the educational controversy. Both the right-wing and the left-wing argu-

ments represent a preoccupation with one of China's fundamental problems, the formation of human capital. The contending positions could conceivably have been reconciled in an interesting educational experiment. But this was not to be. Marxism-Leninism in general, and its Maoist variant in particular, sees debate in much the same way as the Mercantilists saw trade: a state of war the motto of which is "You live, I die; I live; you die." Correctness is pure and unalloyed; there is no room for qualifications.

In spite of the controversy and the bitterness which attended it, much progress was made until 1966. In 1949, some 1.9 million students were enrolled in middle and technical middle schools; by 1965, enrollments in these full-time institutions had risen to an estimated 12.5 million, or less than 2 per cent of the population. In 1949, there were 23.7 million pupils in primary schools; in 1965, they numbered an estimated 90 million, or more than 12 per cent of the population. Not counting people attending spare-time schools, perhaps as much as 15 per cent of China's population was in school by 1965.<sup>10</sup> There was a noticeable shift in enrollments away from the humanities and other liberal disciplines toward engineering, agriculture, medicine and the natural sciences. The achievement was real and the thirst for knowledge was tremendous. Schooling, it should be added, was not free, but tuition fees were modest and scholarships for gifted or ideologically advanced students were readily available.

The Cultural Revolution undid much of the good work. First, all schools were closed, nominally for 12 months but in fact for almost two years, to permit the students to grasp revolution, travel to Peking to see the Chairman and his close comrade-in-arms, Marshal Lin Biao, and steel themselves in simulated miniature Long Marches. Second, the authority of school administrators and

faculties was shattered; much destruction of physical property took place; and many teachers left the profession for less risky jobs. Third, once the roaming children were back in their classrooms (1968), the Chairman issued one of his "latest instructions" defining what appeared to be a disastrous course for China's education. The instruction substituted Mao Tse-tung's works for the numerous, complicated and not immediately relevant works of the so-called "bourgeois, expert authorities," appointed peasant-worker-soldier teams to direct, supervise, and teach in the schools, and turned primary and secondary schools over to factories, enterprises and production brigades, thus absolving the state from this particular financial burden. Worker-peasant-soldier teams were to be stationed in the universities on a permanent basis. The new system proposed to dispense with entrance examinations, shorten the period of study, lower tuition fees, abolish age restrictions and introduce class criteria into the evaluation of student performance.

A good indication of what the educational reform is doing is unwittingly given by a recent issue of *China Reconstructs*.<sup>11</sup> The periodical's language instruction corner gives in literal translation from the Chinese an account of an agronomy class run by a poor peasant in a commune school. (It is only fair to add that a more sophisticated translation is also supplied. The literal rendering, however, gives the flavor of what is going on.)

Guanghui People's Commune's poor and lower-middle peasants manage commune schools. All people recommended old poor peasant Chen Kai-wan to be teacher, go lecture on water rice sow seeds. He said: "In old society we for landlords sowed seeds, planted fields, one year toiled to end, still no rice went down cooking pots. Now we are for revolution, for the country, for socialism sow seeds." Afterwards he only began lecture on sow seed technique. Lecture finished after, he immediately took students to fields to go work, taught them how to sow seeds.

China can certainly use old poor peasant Chen's "rice sow seeds" experience. Whether she can afford to have old poor peasant Chens running her entire educational system is another question. As with public health and

<sup>10</sup> *Ten Great Years* and Hong Kong estimates.

<sup>11</sup> *China Reconstructs*, February, 1969, p. 47. Cf., "Some Tentative Programs for Revolutionizing Education," *Peking Review*, November 17, 1967, pp. 9-11.

labor insurance, there has been a retreat on the educational front in recent years, a costly decline, injurious to the country's need for modernization.

## INDUSTRY

During 1949–1952, industry was rebuilt from the ravages of war; during 1953–1957, it was expanded, especially in its heavy sub-sectors, and modernized with Soviet help. A number of industries, new to China, were established at that time. Among them was nuclear energy. During 1958–1960, Chinese industry was thrown into turmoil, from which it recovered in the course of 1961–1965. After 1960, emphasis shifted from heavy to light industry, particularly to those branches which supplied the countryside with chemical fertilizer, simple tools and goods of everyday use. Progress was solid from 1953 to 1957; it was creditable from 1961 to 1965. In fact, apart from an occasional outburst of irrationality (not unconnected with the left's fixation on speed, weight and numbers, and its fear of and disdain for profitability and economic accounting), industrial development is one of Communist China's more exciting success stories.

The period of industrial wrongheadedness (1958–1960) was costly in terms of waste motion and the indiscriminate splashing around of scarce capital, but it was short and the damage, while substantial, was not irreparable. After 1957, one could not speak of long-range planning, but (1958–1960 excepted) there was a sense of direction and some attempt at year-to-year scheduling, some notion and awareness of the need for internal consistency and of the relation between labor productivity and material incentives.

The most notable production successes during the period for which relatively trustworthy official figures are available (1949–1957) were in steel, pig iron, coal, electric power, petroleum, machine tools, power machinery, chemicals and chemical fertilizers, although the development of the last was

really stepped up only after 1960. Output of crude steel, for example, was 606,000 tons in 1950 and 5.4 million tons in 1957. In 1958, it was said to have jumped to 8 million tons (not including steel made by "indigenous," i.e., backyard, furnaces). It is estimated that at the present time steel production in China is in the region of 12 million tons per year.

Chemical fertilizers produced domestically amounted to 70,000 tons in 1950 and 631,000 tons in 1957. The estimate for 1968 is about 9 million tons. In 1950, the country produced roughly 200,000 tons of crude oil. The 1957 output was 1.5 million tons, and the present estimated output is about 10 million tons per year. Refining capacity has been expanded and updated. In general, there has been a widening of the variety of the products, and the quality—while not sensational by international standards—has been raised to levels that appear to be satisfactory from the standpoint of developing countries.

In spite of the post-1960 emphasis on light industry, the output of consumer goods has lagged behind that of producer goods. The one official Chinese statistical manual (*Ten Great Years*) lists only five categories of industrial consumers' goods: cotton cloth (2.5 billion meters in 1950; 5 billion meters in 1957, and probably not much more than 6 billion meters at the present time), paper, rubber footwear, bicycles and cigarettes.

A point not often brought out in Western analyses of China's industrial economy is its  
(Continued on page 177)

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<sup>12</sup> *Ten Great Years and Quarterly Economic Review: China, Hong Kong, North Korea*, Annual Supplement, 1969.

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*"China's offensive capability generally is of a very low order. The very factors that favor a defensive capability militate against an offensive capacity: the weak economy; the poor transport system; the poor logistics capability; and the general ethos and organization of the P.L.A."*

## China's Military Capabilities

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THE PRESENT leadership of the Chinese People's Republic (C.P.R.) sees China as the "bastion of socialism" under siege. The main thrust of Chinese military policies, including nuclear policies, is essentially defensive. China's primary conventional capability is the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) which is estimated to be at the strength of a little over 2.5 million men, about 2 per cent of China's manpower of military age. In addition, there is a militia force said to number over 200 million men and women.

The militia is poorly equipped and is not highly trained. Only about 15 per cent of the men and women in the militia receive any military training beyond single target practicing. The militia has a whole range of social and political roles, particularly in the countryside, connected with mass mobilization for political and economic goals. In peacetime, this would seem to be more important than any putative military roles assigned to it. The hard core or "basic" militia is made up of army reservists, demobilized soldiers, local activists and party members. These are said to constitute a "trained" reserve for the P.L.A. But the militia is essentially a local organization belonging to particular localities and is not a general reserve army capable of mobilization on short notice to be deployed on a cross-country basis. Indeed, its most important military role would arise in case of an actual armed invasion. The militia

units would then become local defense units for villages and communes and would also act as guerrilla support units for the P.L.A. The militia would be expected to perform a whole variety of guerrilla roles, the main purpose of which would be to "bleed" the invading armies. Meanwhile, the P.L.A. could retreat inland to wait until the invaders became overextended with relatively isolated divisions and regiments. At that point, theoretically, the regular forces would destroy the invaders in piece-meal fashion until the P.L.A. felt sufficiently confident of victory to challenge the invaders directly.

In such a defensive situation, with China facing a major war, the militia would clearly play a primary role. Furthermore, for this type of role the militia need not have a high level of military training, nor need it even be well armed. The overwhelming majority of the militia does not appear to be armed at all. In the defensive situation envisaged here, even this may not be so great a disadvantage as may appear at first sight. In Maoist language, the militia to a large extent constitutes the "sea of humanity" in which the enemy would be "drowned" and in which the P.L.A. would swim like "fish in water," to defeat the invaders.

As long as the bulk of the population is basically loyal and semi-organized along these lines the militia would have a vital and viable role to play in a major invasion of China.



As a result of China's low level of economic development, her comparatively small industrial base, her relatively poor transportation system and her policies of "self-reliance," she cannot mobilize and arm a vast army quickly. Furthermore, the Chinese simply do not have the economic capacity to copy the enormously wide range of the multi-faceted military procurement programs of the United States or the Soviet Union. The Chinese cannot develop nuclear weapons and a range of delivery systems while at the same time directing their design staffs, research and development teams and their heavy industry to turn out the vast panoply of the modern sub-nuclear weaponry available to the two super-powers.

Should the Chinese decide to do this, the problems would be enormous. They have a long handicap to overcome; their design teams do not have the precious experience of their Western and Russian counterparts; they drain on scarce, skilled industrial and scientific manpower and on material resources would denude the civil sectors of the economy.

There is no question that the present leadership of China is keenly aware of the economic distortions that would follow from giving the military priority over economic development. In addition, the social and political implications of such a course are diametrically opposed to the general values and policies espoused by Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

It would be wrong to draw from this the conclusion that the present Chinese leadership is opposed to the indigenous manufacture and development of highly modern armaments. On the contrary, since the withdrawal of Soviet assistance in 1960, the Chinese have been making considerable efforts to produce their own advanced aircraft, naval vessels, tanks and so forth—and not without a degree of success. For example, the Chinese now produce their own versions of MIG-19's and MIG-21's. The concern of the present Chinese leadership focuses more on the organizational level and political controls of the army.

## **THE FUNCTIONS OF THE P.L.A.**

The classic functions of armies are external defense and internal peace-keeping. Armies are traditionally kept at one remove from the people; they are housed, clothed and fed away from the general populace; they have elitist officer corps and the members of the armed forces are trained and socialized to perform their exclusive roles. The Chinese army, however, operates in close contact with the bulk of the people, helping the peasantry in the fields, participating in factory management, playing an important role in the educational sphere, and broadly fulfilling a whole range of political and organizational functions.

During the Cultural Revolution these civic roles of the P.L.A. became even further accentuated. In many respects, the P.L.A. (while not without its "powerholders following along the capitalist road") became the only national organization functioning at all levels of the political system as the custodian of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, P.L.A. men helped to train and organize the various Red Guard groups. And later still, when the movement appeared to be on the point of disintegration as a result of the fragmentations of the various struggling groups, the P.L.A. was called in "to support the left, but not any particular faction." P.L.A. members figure prominently in the various "three way revolutionary committees" that appear to dominate all levels of current Chinese administration and production units. At the time of writing (early July, 1969) there are signs that a somewhat refashioned party apparatus is being brought back to life. Presumably this will mean that the P.L.A.'s high degree of active participation in the direction of the socio-economic life of the country will be cut back (to what extent it is too early to determine).

The P.L.A., therefore, is unlike other modern armies. Nevertheless it must still perform the classic function of other armies—external defense. As we have already seen, in the event of a major armed invasion of China, the P.L.A. regular forces would re-

treat in the initial phases and engage in frontal attack only when the enemy's lines were judged to be so overextended and his general problems so intractable that P.L.A. victory would be virtually assured.

Clearly, there is much scope in this strategy for the deployment of the most up-to-date weaponry. Generally, the Chinese envisage such a war as being launched either by the Americans or by the Russians. They argue that the starting point would probably be a surprise nuclear attack which would seek to destroy at one stroke China's military strength, economic centers and major communications networks. The object would be to destroy China's will to resist, but it would fail. Because of her vast territory and huge population, China would not be destroyed. The attackers would have to follow their nuclear strike with an armed invasion of Chinese territory. The Chinese would then resort to the strategy and tactics of a "people's war," and the adversary would ultimately be defeated. Indeed, the Chinese anticipate that the enemy would be superior in the air, at sea and in conventional fire-power on the ground. Consequently, the only effective counter-measure would be a "people's war." In this view, nuclear weapons would not replace decisive battle by ground forces.

Several aspects of this inherently defensive doctrine do not seem realistic. First, the United States or the Soviet Union might be satisfied with "taking out" certain strategic targets and might find it neither necessary nor worthwhile to follow such an attack with an armed invasion. Second, this doctrine makes no allowance for conflict situations short of an all-out invasion. These may range from border conflicts to local limited wars on the Korean pattern.

However, the main point of this doctrine is its defensive nature; it is well suited to present Chinese conditions. The inadequate transportation and communications systems would favor a defending force which could always fall back on well situated and already prepared supply depots. The attacking force, moreover, facing a hostile population and having to carry its own supplies, would find

logistics problems of nightmarish proportions in China. Furthermore, a defensive strategy does not impose too great a military burden on a relatively weak economy under present peacetime conditions; in wartime, the armed forces would not suffer unduly from being cut off from their industrial base. The major weakness in this doctrine is its implicit acknowledgement of China's defenselessness against a nuclear strike. China's nuclear development program is now clearly designed to close this gap in her defenses.

### THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY

China, with more than 3,000 aircraft, has one of the largest air forces in the world after the United States and the Soviet Union. The bulk of the planes, however, are obsolescent, including 150 Il-28 light jet bombers and very large numbers of MIG-15's and MIG-17's. The airlift capability is negligible. Nevertheless, the strength of the air force has been improving steadily since the mid-1960's: the Chinese have been producing their own versions of MIG-19's and MIG-21's which by now may number several hundred. Thus the Chinese have largely recovered from the severe impasse consequent upon the Soviet withdrawal of assistance in 1960.

For many years, China appeared to have only a thin aerial defense network over the coastal areas, but during the last 4 or 5 years this has been gradually expanded to protect the interior. There is now an extensive radar network and an interceptor force increasingly made up of MIG-19 and MIG-21 fighters. Furthermore, in the critical areas of China (in the South adjacent to Vietnam, in Manchuria and in the North West) the Chinese, in the same period, have enlarged existing facilities and have built new air bases which are now protected by surface-to-air missiles (SA-2 Guideline type) and a large number of manned interceptors on ready alert. The Canton Military Region is reliably reported to have had at least 200 fighter interceptors at constant readiness. The situation on the Russian front may be presumed to be roughly similar. Since the United States bombing of

North Vietnam started, the Chinese have claimed to have downed a number of United States aircraft (including Phantoms as well as reconnaissance aircraft). It would seem reasonable to assert therefore that nothing short of a massive aerial attack would breach these defenses.

The Chinese navy is probably the weakest of the armed services. Its amphibious capability is negligible. It would not be able to support a P.L.A. offensive across a long stretch of water against an adequately equipped and determined opponent. Like the other two services, its capability is essentially defensive. The fleet consists of a very small modern surface fleet (4 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts and 11 frigate escorts); about 35 submarines of different types including at least one G-class submarine (with three ballistic missile tubes for medium-range ballistic missiles); about a score of minesweepers, 150 motor torpedo boats and a variety of relatively obsolescent gunboats. The submarines and, in special situations, the motor torpedo boats present the main threat to a potentially offensive modern naval power. The Chinese navy also has about 150 IR-28 torpedo-carrying jet light bombers which could represent a threat to an invasion fleet.

Generally, however, the Chinese navy would not constitute a serious threat to the naval forces that the Soviets or the Americans could mount against China. It does, however, fulfill a role for coastal defense against forces pitched at a lower level than a fully fledged Soviet or United States attack. China has a small merchant fleet, and generally does not depend much on foreign trade (at least trade is not a question of life or death for the Chinese economy).

The eastern seaboard of China, including the major industrial complex of Shanghai and other important centers, is vulnerable to a sea-based offensive by the major naval powers.

#### **CHINA'S CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY**

China's offensive capability generally is of

a very low order. The very factors that favor the defensive capability based on a "people's war" strategy militate against an offensive capacity: the weak economy; the poor transport system; the poor logistics capability; and the general ethos and organization of the army. Furthermore, the Chinese have had no successful experience of combined operations involving ground and air forces. Even in situations which favored the Chinese, their air force has not performed well: the kill ratio in Korea (even in the "MIG Corridor") was something in the order of 10:1 against the Chinese; in 1958 and thereafter, the Chinese air force has performed badly over the Taiwan straits. Against India in 1962, the Chinese air force was conspicuous by its absence. Such information as is available indicates that although the Russians have used aircraft in the recent Sino-Soviet border conflicts, the Chinese have not done so.

The logistics problems of moving Chinese P.L.A. forces to South and Southeast Asia are enormous. China could send troops in relatively large numbers into North Vietnam but the available routes are highly vulnerable to aerial attack and this vulnerability increases tremendously south of Hanoi. Furthermore, Chinese and Vietnam railways have different gauge tracks. The major road route follows close to the sea coast along at least one major section. The problems of moving troops and their supplies on a large scale to South Vietnam over the Ho Chi Minh trail, hazardous at the best of times, would be almost impossible to sustain against determined United States opposition. The same holds true for the rest of Southeast Asia.

Thus against determined opposition from the United States and the people in the area, the Chinese would find the deployment of masses of men a seriously hazardous operation. Southeast Asia is, by and large, outside the range of Chinese infantry in any significant numbers. Furthermore, the military doctrines of the C.P.R. leadership militate against any attempt so to deploy Chinese forces. In the Maoist view, it is up to the

people in the various countries to make their own revolution. The C.P.R. has been prepared to encourage, foster and support various insurrectionary forces in the area, but at no point has China sent in her own forces to fight alongside, or as substitutes for, the indigenous revolutionary forces.

Following the easy Chinese victory over the Indian forces in 1962 it seems that (regardless of her intentions) China lacked the logistics capability to support a major fighting force in the Indian plains from the Himalayas. Because China lacks any sort of amphibious capability, it is also obviously beyond her powers to conquer Taiwan, transporting forces 100 miles across the Taiwan straits. The air force, likewise, lacks this capability.

The only area in which geography might favor Chinese offensive capability is the territory adjacent to Manchuria. Of course, North Korea would still provide good logistic and deployment routes for Chinese forces. However, without Soviet support—and facing a United States-supported South Korea—another Korean adventure could prove disastrous for China. There are no indications that the Chinese are thinking in these offensive terms. On the contrary, available evidence indicates precisely the opposite. As for the Soviet border area, the transportation system favors attackers from the south rather than from the north. But given the disparity of the two opposing forces in the area and the improbability that the Chinese air force could establish total command of the air against the Soviet air force, this, too, is an area in which a Chinese offensive capability can be ruled out.

The rest of the 4,500-mile Sino-Soviet border is largely remote, desolate and barren and gives the Chinese no logistics advantage over the Russians. Were it not for the major mountain ranges that form much of the border, the Chinese western regions would be highly vulnerable to Russian attack. The Mongolian plateau is geographically more favorable, but if anything this would tend to favor the Soviets.

Thus China's offensive capability north-

ward against the Russians or to the south in the face of determined United States opposition would seem to be negligible. This is not to argue that China does not pose military problems for her southern neighbors, but rather that these problems are more indirect (and political) than any analogy with the Soviet Red Army would suggest. The popular imagery of Chinese hordes poised to pour into surrounding territory is patently false.

Furthermore, this basic situation is unlikely to be altered substantially until fundamental changes occur in China's transport system and until her industrial base becomes sufficiently large and varied to support a far greater range of military production. Such changes tend to be measured in decades rather than years. Consequently it is unrealistic to expect radical change in this context during the foreseeable future.

#### THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICTS

The Chinese have something like 300,000 border troops organized into roughly 20 infantry divisions and 30 independent regiments in addition to and outside the regular P.L.A. forces stationed near the borders. On the few occasions that the border troops have engaged in armed conflicts and skirmishes—notably along the Sino-Indian borders and more recently and currently along Sino-Soviet borders, especially on some of the small islands of the Ussuri and Amur (or Heilung Kiang) rivers—they have given a good account of themselves.

The scale of the fighting since March, 1969, over these border islands has been somewhat exaggerated. Both the Chinese and the Russians appear to have good political reasons to exaggerate, but from their own detailed accounts so far the fighting has been highly localized and the casualties on both sides have totaled no more than 200 to 300 (the overwhelming majority have been wounded). The Chinese claim that there are 600 to 700 islands in dispute plus a disputed border involving more than 1,000 square kilometers. Neither side seems to have felt that the localized conflicts would



get out of hand and escalate into a major confrontation.

Could this situation develop into a major Sino-Soviet war? There is no doubt that the entire 4,000-mile Sino-Soviet border is bedeviled by many high-tension areas. The Kazakhstan-Sinkiang border area involves the fundamental national security interests of both countries. In addition to its relative proximity to China's nuclear and missile sites 900-1000 miles away, important Russian and Chinese minority nationality groups span both sides of the border. In keeping with their nomadic traditions and historical patterns they have migrated across the frontiers at various times in the past 50 years, and their loyalty to their respective states is by no means guaranteed. Further north and east there is some dispute as to where the border actually runs but, as indicated earlier, the mountain ranges along these borders preclude major conventional military activities by either side. The few key communications routes would seem to be well defended on both sides.

Along the hundreds of miles of major navigable rivers which constitute China's northeast border a whole series of issues is in dispute, including the ownership of hundreds of minor islands, navigation rights, fishing rights, and the correct procedure in individual cases of distress. The Chinese have called for renegotiation of the borders which were established by "unequal treaties" but have repeatedly and authoritatively stated (i.e., in government statements on the subject in early 1969 and in Vice-Chairman Lin Piao's political report to the Ninth Party Congress) that they do not claim the vast tracts of territory of the Soviet Far East. Nonetheless, in the heat of Sino-Soviet polemics, Mao asserted in 1964 that the Chinese "have not yet presented their account" for these areas.

Russians are reluctant to engage in such negotiations and appear to wish to deal with the specific points in dispute through the established procedure of the Sino-Soviet Border Commission. Each side has continually accused the other of bad faith. In

addition to the familiar issues of the Sino-Soviet disputes of the late 1960's, the Chinese are very mindful of the possible implications for them of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty." The Russians, on the other hand, have long standing fears of a resurgent China. They see the whole course of the Cultural Revolution, including the attacks on the party apparatus and the continual excoriation of the Russians built into the Chinese political and educational systems, as having potentially very long term effects. Furthermore, they see Mao as a "petty bourgeois fanatic" who now presides over a military dictatorship.

Although the border situation is clearly very tense, there is no evidence to indicate that both sides do not have firm central control of the situation. The particular issues themselves would not seem to warrant a major war by either side, although the Russians and the Chinese play upon these issues for a variety of reasons that do not arise out of the border situation itself. Such potential for major armed conflict as does exist arises out of long standing and intractable mutual hostility. However, it is difficult to envisage a major Sino-Soviet war even in the current context. The costs to each side would be enormous and would not be offset by the possible gains. Even if one could envisage a Soviet blitzkrieg into Manchuria (which seems highly doubtful) followed by an extremely ruthless counterinsurgency policy, the Chinese could prolong the war almost indefinitely. While the Russians have the capability to destroy much of China with nuclear weapons, it does not seem that they could take China by force.

### **CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY**

China's achievements in the development of a nuclear program have been impressive both in the speed of her progress and in the variety of weapons tested. But the Chinese have yet to demonstrate any effective delivery capability. China has demonstrated considerable sophistication in nuclear armaments. The speed of her nuclear develop-

ment—from the first detonation of a low-yield atomic device to her first successful multimegaton hydrogen bomb test (incidentally dropped from an aircraft) was just over two and one-half years. This was far less time than was required by the other four nuclear powers. Furthermore, the Chinese have overcome a wide range of technical problems to reduce the size of their atomic and thermonuclear warheads to manageable proportions for delivery purposes. Thus in October, 1966, the Chinese successfully tested a low-yield atomic warhead carried by a guided missile over a distance of 400–600 miles. By now Chinese nuclear facilities could probably have produced enough missile material for 80 to 90 low-yield atomic bombs and for a small number of multimegaton hydrogen bombs.

China does not yet have a credible delivery system. She has something less than a dozen obsolete Tu-4 medium bombers (the Russian copies of the American B-29) of post-World War II vintage. These constitute the only available aircraft capable of delivering her nuclear weapons to strategic targets in Asia. The Chinese are known to be working hard on a missile procurement program, particularly aimed at the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (I.C.B.M.'s). The Chinese have the ability to produce medium and probably also intermediate range ballistic missiles (M.R.B.M.'s and I.R.B.M.'s).

Chinese progress in the missile field (unlike that in the nuclear field) has not measured up in the past two years to some of the Western forecasts, notably that of the former United States Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, who predicted a Chinese I.C.B.M. booster test before the end of 1967. Nevertheless it seems likely that the Chinese will finally run such a test within the next two years. It has been reliably reported that a complete I.R.B.M. complex has been constructed near Nagchu Dzong in western China, but that it is not yet operational. When fully operational, all the border states from Afghanistan to Vietnam and west of the Russian defensive positions along the

Sino-Soviet border will be within range of China's I.R.B.M.'s.

It is, however, precisely at this stage that China is most vulnerable. She is on the point of procuring a first-strike nuclear capability against appropriate regional targets (e.g., United States and Soviet bases in eastern Asia) and perhaps even a first-strike capability against limited targets in the United States and European Russia. China, therefore, becomes an obvious target for either superpower for a preemptive strike should such an action be judged necessary. Although the Chinese have repeatedly pledged that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons in a major crisis, such a pledge may not count for much.

Clearly only the credible deployment of a second-strike capability would offer China the defense and therefore the full sovereignty she demands.


The options open to the Chinese for a second-strike capability appear to be as follows:

- a) A submarine-based delivery system of M.R.B.M.'s and I.R.B.M.'s;
- b) Land-based missiles mounted on rails, dispersed and highly mobile;
- c) Missiles housed in hardened sites.

None of these options seems viable before the 1980's. The procurement of an ocean-going submarine fleet equipped with missile tubes would require a massive industrial program, because this would involve a complex weapons system. The Chinese experience and starting base in this field are so limited that the whole enterprise, even if currently under way, would not bear fruit before the 1980's.

Mobile missile launching pads would be heavily dependent upon China's railway networks. Railroads already play a crucial role in China's internal transportation system and this system might be seriously disrupted if it were used for a missile role. Thus the railways network would probably have to be radically extended before it could be useful in this regard. Such an extension would obviously enhance the second-strike value of a missile force.

Housing the missile force in hardened sites



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## CHINA'S NORTHERN BORDER

would apparently offer the Chinese the most feasible possibility of an early second-strike capability. However, because of the greater and increasing accuracy of United States and Russian guidance systems, a small number of missiles would be strategically too vulnerable and would therefore be inadequate. The Chinese would require a large number of missile pads (perhaps 100 to 200) to have a credible second-strike capability. Current Western assessments of Chinese stockpiling capacity estimate this capacity in the order of 10 I.C.B.M.'s per annum and material sufficient for 15 to 20 low-yield atomic bombs and a few hydrogen bombs. If these estimates are roughly correct, it will be at least 10 years before the Chinese have a second-strike capability.

Present Chinese strategic doctrine, as we have seen earlier, does not give any sort of effective military role to China's nuclear forces—and rightly so. The present value of the Chinese nuclear capacity is three-fold. Nuclear capacity is a necessary component of Chinese claims for superpower status, giving China additional political leverage in her relations with her neighbors and leverage over her neighbors' relations with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Nuclear capacity is also a symbol of "self-reliance": the Chinese can go it alone. And it is a means by which they hope to acquire

an advanced technology, and the confidence that ultimately they will overcome the major gaps in their national defense.

This analysis suggests that the Chinese do not have an effective offensive capability against any of their neighbors because of the nature of the organization, the equipment and the ethos of their armed forces and their lack of economic development. Nonetheless, China's defenses should be adequate against a major armed invasion. There are gaps in her defenses in three areas: first, against a major aerial attack (conventional or nuclear) designed to destroy her nuclear and industrial bases; second, against a naval-based attack along her eastern seaboard; and, finally, against a Soviet blitzkrieg on Manchuria.

China's leadership is very conscious of the country's strategic vulnerability and has long pursued a cautious policy in all situations which might lead to major national defense problems. Past actions and present postures support the hypothesis that China's primary concerns are the security of her frontiers, the assertion of Chinese sovereignty over

*(Continued on page 182)*

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*Writing of Sino-Soviet hostility, this specialist notes that "Today's Maoism has been in practice a return to the concept of revolutionary warfare once propagated by Moscow." But today, "Maoism is unacceptable . . . within the structure of Marxism-Leninism as known in the Soviet-dominated world."*

## Twenty Years of Sino-Soviet Relations

BY FRANZ MICHAEL

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**W**HEN THE CHINESE Communists came to power in 1949 they were part and parcel of the Communist world revolution. This revolution had obtained its first victory in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, and its further advance was promoted from Moscow.

In the non-industrial areas of the world this revolution was to apply methods that differed from those to be applied in the capitalist countries of the West. It was Vladimir Lenin who conceived the strategy of "national liberation movements" to be applied by communism in the non-industrial areas of the world. It was Joseph Stalin who guided the strategy through its stages of development. In its exploitation of nationalist anti-imperialism and agrarian discontent, communism could stir revolutions and gain power in the countries of the Afro-Asian world. The victory was to be brought about by military action through "wars of national liberation" under a political framework that maintained the fiction of a pre-socialist revolution leading to the establishment of people's republics. The Chinese People's Republic established in September, 1949, was established under this doctrinal concept.

The victory in China was accomplished not by a general strike or proletarian uprising nor by a peasant rebellion, but rather by military action in a prolonged civil war. During the conflict, the Communist political organization was practically fused with the

Communist army. It was the army—and the party within the army—which controlled whatever provinces and cities the Communists held during the civil war, and this military political structure provided the special form of Chinese communism. The specific party-army organization that brought the Communists to power in China was, therefore, the result of the strategy of revolutionary warfare derived from Moscow.

After the victory, Chinese communism under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung aimed at the establishment of a political system à la Moscow. A greatly expanded party structure was to control both the government and the army. The transition was made easier by the transfer of a substantial number of military leaders into the government and party structure. Under the new system, China was to accept economic planning after the Soviet model. A five year plan was introduced and Soviet aid was provided to accelerate the Chinese transition to a modern industrial economy. Mao Tse-tung went to Moscow shortly after the seizure of power to obtain in prolonged negotiations a treaty of alliance directed against any renewed aggression by Japan or "any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in the acts of aggression." The treaty also provided for "economic and cultural ties" and economic assistance and co-operation in the development of China's new industrial program. A credit of the equiva-



lent of \$300 million was promised to underwrite the payment for Soviet deliveries of industrial equipment. Sino-Soviet joint stock companies for mining and oil operations, airlines and shipbuilding plants were to be established in Manchuria and Sinkiang. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, China was to "lean to one side."

This agreement initiated the first phase of close Sino-Soviet cooperation. Together with the equipment, over 10,000 Soviet advisers went to China to assist in Chinese industrial construction. Russian was introduced as the first foreign language in the Chinese educational system and Russian books in the original and in translation were widely distributed through China. Soviet films, newspapers and art were to revolutionize the Chinese people, and exchange visits between Soviet and Chinese professors and artists were to link the two countries intellectually.

Before the Communist victory, the Soviets had reestablished their position in Manchuria on the basis of the 1945 Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance and friendship of August, 1945, concluded with the Nationalist Chinese government. These agreements gave the Soviets special railroad rights in Manchuria, a free port in Dairen and a joint naval base at Port Arthur.

### THE JUNIOR PARTNER

The Communist victory brought a change in the relationship. In 1952, the Soviets returned the Manchurian railroads to Chinese management but retained temporarily the naval base at Port Arthur, "at the invitation of Peking," presumably as a backing for the Chinese participation in the Korean War. In 1953, when the first Chinese five year plan was initiated, Moscow promised equipment and technical aid for the establishment of 41 large-scale industrial enterprises which included the building and management of steel mills in several provinces. These agreements were signed in Moscow after prolonged negotiations in which the Chinese Communists appeared as the junior partners of a new Communist relationship.

This relationship changed after the death

of Stalin. In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev headed a Soviet delegation that went to Peking to conclude a new treaty on economic aid. Aside from abolishing the joint stock companies, this agreement added another 15 industrial enterprises to those already provided for by Soviet aid and promised another long-term loan of \$230 million. The most important aspect of the treaty was the agreement to build two railroad lines linking Soviet Asia and Communist China through Outer Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. The latter line, in particular, was to serve the purpose of linking the Soviet industrial development of Central Asia with that planned by Communist China with Soviet aid in her Central Asian territory. There oil and mineral resources—including uranium—made such development most promising.

This agreement characterized the high point of Sino-Soviet cooperation and a new type of partnership. With the death of Stalin, Mao had become a senior leader within the Communist world, and Communist China's role was enhanced. Khrushchev's visit to Peking appears to have served his purpose—to achieve Chinese support in his power struggle in Moscow. In comparison to Georgi Malenkov, Khrushchev at the time presented the harder line of Soviet policy, a line favored by the Chinese Communist leadership.

This close relationship was shaken by Khrushchev's secret speech on Stalin in 1956 at the Twentieth Soviet Congress. The attack on Stalin and the subsequent de-Stalinization came as a surprise to Chinese Communist leadership. The new Soviet policy jeopardized the position of Mao, who had been a Stalinist. Mao had succeeded in building himself up as the unchallenged leader in China whose "Thought" had been referred to in the Chinese party constitution of 1945, together with Marxism-Leninism, as the guide for Chinese Communist policy. At the Eighth Chinese Communist Congress in March, 1956, a new party constitution introduced collective leadership and omitted the mention of Mao and Mao's Thought. The Congress carried over, however, into a second

session held in 1958; in the meantime Mao began to fight to retain his position. A Chinese reaction to de-Stalinization modified the attack against Stalin, but Peking continued to follow the overall line established by Moscow. The "thaw" in the Soviet Union was matched by the Hundred Flowers movement in China. But while the "thaw" had been a general literary protest against the controls of Stalin's years, the Hundred Flowers was an artificially stimulated political criticism of the past mistakes of the Chinese Communist regime. The mistakes were to be blamed on the lower cadres and not on the Communist leaders, since Mao could hardly be expected to de-Mao himself. The movement was meant to function as a controlled safety valve to remove the steam accumulated under Communist rule. When instead it erupted into a violent attack directed against the party and its leadership and communism in general, Mao was further disillusioned by Moscow's political line.

#### ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION

At this crucial moment of contest for power within China, Mao went to Moscow to participate in the Inter-Party Congress which resulted in the Moscow Declaration of 1957. The differences between Moscow and Peking were patched over for a time in a formulation of strategies which could serve later for differing interpretations by Moscow and Peking. As a part of the attempted reconciliation, in a special weapons agreement, Moscow provided Peking with the assistance needed to enable China to develop thermonuclear arms.

Mao's attempt to gain Khrushchev's acceptance of his demand for a share in Communist world leadership was disregarded by the Soviet leader. After de-Stalinization, Mao did not want to be surprised again by a decision taken in Moscow which could threaten his position. He wanted a share in the determination of the general political line; he wanted "real, not only formal, consultation." Khrushchev refused and Mao returned home to challenge Moscow's hegemony.

#### MAO'S CHALLENGE TO MOSCOW'S LEADERSHIP

Moscow's leadership of the Communist movement no longer rested on institutional grounds. With the dissolution of the Comintern by Stalin in 1943 and of the Cominform by Khrushchev in 1956, no international Communist organization existed which would provide Moscow with institutional control of the movement. Moscow's role as the "universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement" was based only on the acceptance within the movement of Moscow's practical lead. This was gained through the Soviet revolutionary experience and economic advance which presumably placed the U.S.S.R. ahead of the others on the road to the Communist future. The Soviet lead on the way to communism had to be overcome by any party attempting to challenge the Soviet hegemony in the Communist world. Such a challenge to Soviet leadership was attempted by Mao through the Great Leap and the commune system in the fall of 1958.

After the second meeting of the Eighth Party Congress, Mao through sheer bravado gained the reluctant support of the party for his plan to move China forward through the application of revolutionary warfare tactics, will power and organization. In the exaggerated claims of the Chinese press of the time, the Great Leap and the commune system had increased Chinese production many times, providing the affluence which was to enable China to achieve a form of instant communism and, in the process, to "bypass the Soviet Union on the way to communism."

When the purpose of the Great Leap was understood, the Soviet Union strongly objected. Khrushchev criticized the Chinese shortcut to communism as a method tried and found wanting in early Soviet history. Soviet opposition and the internal problems arising out of Mao's ambitious plan led to a Chinese Communist retreat, which began at a Chinese Central Committee meeting at Lushan in December, 1958. Together with a resolution which greatly modified the ambitious plans of the Great Leap and the com-

mune system, the Central Committee accepted Mao's resignation from the position of Chairman of the Republic, apparently as the price exacted by the Soviet leadership for further badly needed economic aid. A new agreement was concluded by Vice Premier Chou En-lai on a visit to Moscow in January, 1959, under which 31 additional industrial plants were to be built in China with Soviet aid. Mao's challenge had failed and had resulted in a further reduction of his position. His successor for the chairmanship of the Republic, Liu Shao-chi, dismantled the Commune system and the programs of the Great Leap step by step in order to overcome the economic catastrophe of 1959-1960.

The gravest threat against Mao came at a Central Committee meeting in July, 1959, when his program of the Great Leap came under attack by Minister of Defense P'eng Teh-huai as a policy of "petit bourgeois fanaticism" which would bring economic disaster. This attack was presumably made with the foreknowledge of Khrushchev, whom P'eng had previously seen on his visit in the Crimea. The bitter fight which ensued was won by Mao: P'eng was dismissed and with him some 40 Chinese military and party leaders. Thereafter, P'eng was replaced as Minister of Defense by Lin Piao, a loyal follower of Mao. Under his command, the People's Liberation Army became the main instrument for the build-up of the cult of Mao and of Mao's Thought as a means to restore Mao's leadership.

### THE FIGHT AGAINST REVISIONISM

Though the communes and the Great Leap were never officially abandoned, the claim of China's imminent entrance into the final stage of communism could obviously not be maintained; the assertion that the Chinese were ahead of the Soviets on the way to the Communist goal was also dropped. The argument shifted to an attempt to disqualify the rival whose head start could not be overcome. The Soviets had moved off the road altogether; they were "capitalist roaders" and "revisionists," and China alone followed the proper course which others should follow.

At first, the conflict remained below the surface. In October of 1959, Khrushchev came to Peking to participate in the 10-year celebration of the Chinese Communist victory, but the coolness of the Sino-Soviet relationship was apparent. In 1960, the Chinese Communists participated in the Inter-Party Conference in Moscow and accepted the Moscow statement signed by the 81 participating Communist parties; but, as became apparent later, the statement was a compromise to paper over the conflict and was reached after considerable argument. The interpretation of the line as laid down in the Declaration of 1957 and the Statement of 1960 became the basis of mutual accusations between Moscow and Peking. The attacks were first carried out by proxy, with Moscow condemning China's ally, Stalinist Albania, and Peking attacking Tito's "revisionism," each side by implication condemning the deviation of the other. In 1960, the entire group of Soviet advisers was withdrawn from China, leaving uncompleted the projects under construction. The Soviet withdrawal aggravated the economic catastrophe caused by the Great Leap. At the beginning of 1961, a last attempt was made to renegotiate Soviet economic aid which resulted in little more than an arrangement for repayment of the debt which China owed the Soviet Union. The full-scale battle was renewed after the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress in 1961.

The year 1963 witnessed the height of the so-called ideological battles. Both sides agreed to meet in July for a discussion of their conflict in preparation for a general inter-party meeting. But before the meeting was held, the Chinese published a 50,000-word letter to the Central Committee of the Soviet Party containing sharp attacks against Khrushchev's policy. The letter was answered in July by an open letter of the Central Committee of the Soviet Party directed to all branches of the party in the Soviet Union containing a rebuttal of the Chinese statements and counter-accusations.

This open letter, in turn, provoked a detailed Chinese attack in nine pamphlets issued during the end of 1963 and the be-

ginning of 1964. The pamphlets dealt with the origin of the Sino-Soviet conflict; the question of de-Stalinization; Yugoslav revisionism; alleged Soviet aid to neocolonialism; the issue of war and peace; peaceful coexistence; "splitting" the movement; Khrushchev's revisionism; and "phony communism," as interpreted by the Chinese leadership.

The Chinese attack on Khrushchev was amplified by a five-volume Chinese history of Khrushchev's statements to document his past views and unreliability. Many of the accusations in these Sino-Soviet exchanges were false. The Soviets had not abandoned revolution or wars of liberation nor had the Chinese propagated hydrogen war. Both sides regarded peaceful coexistence as a policy not of peace but of advancing communism through means other than world war. The statements quoted were taken out of context and distorted, but the battle behind the ideological arguments was real enough.

Khrushchev's fall led to a temporary respite in the mutual propaganda barrages. Vice Premier Chou En-lai went to Moscow to survey the situation but obviously was not satisfied with Moscow's willingness to accept Chinese terms, and in 1964 the Chinese attacked "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev."

#### **VIETNAM AND THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION**

Throughout the period of growing Sino-Soviet hostility, a conflict was building up within China, indirectly related to the battle between Moscow and Peking. Mao's attempt to bypass the Soviet Union on the way to communism and thus to secure doctrinal and practical leadership of the movement, and the failure of his attempt, produced an internal Chinese crisis. The reduction of Mao's authority in the leadership of domestic affairs placed him in opposition to the Chinese Communist party leadership. To regain power, Mao built up his support in the military and, through the military, among the people at large. The growing conflict within Communist China, however, did not at first affect

the backing given Mao at home in his battle against the Soviet leaders. On the surface, the Chinese party leadership joined Mao in condemning Soviet revisionism and backed him in his stress on the strategy of national liberation movements and violence in Chinese foreign policy. Liu Shao-chi and other leaders did not indicate any deviation from the Maoist line; but the apparent unity concealed a growing conflict.

Internal unity was shaken in 1965 as an indirect result of the United States intervention in Vietnam. When this intervention prevented a threatened Communist takeover in South Vietnam, the Soviets, who by this time provided the major support of Hanoi, called for unity among the Communist countries to secure a united Communist front in the war in Vietnam. This appeal found an echo among Chinese party—and even some military—leaders. In May, 1965, Liu Shao-chi indicated that he supported a policy of unity for the sake of Vietnam. What was more, the chief of staff and head of the secret police, Lo Jui-ching, gave his support to the unity concept. In September, 1965, Lo Jui-ching went even farther; describing the conflict as a "debate" and stressing its benefits for communism he said:

One aspect of the historic significance of the debate of the last few years between the two lines in the international Communist movement is that it has enabled Marxism-Leninism to spread on an unprecedented scale and has promoted the integration of the universal truth throughout Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the People's Revolution in every country.

Nowhere else had any Communist indicated so clearly the advantages that communism could gain from the divided stress on different strategies. Now, however, as the Soviets saw the situation, the time for unity had come.

From Mao's viewpoint, any attack against his opposition to Moscow could fatally undermine his independent position in intra-Communist and international affairs and threaten his political survival. Thus Moscow's call for unity and the Chinese reaction triggered a move already in preparation: the Great



Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao's all-out attack against the Soviet Union and against the party opposition in Communist China.

## PARTY REALIGNMENT

Step by step, Mao succeeded in purging most of the leadership in power and replaced party leaders with his followers. Lo was purged sometime in November of 1965 and with his fall all the military was in the hands of Lin Biao and Mao. The buildup of the image of Mao and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung as the answers to all problems had prepared the ground for the use of the army as the major force in the overthrow of the party and government structure no longer loyal to Mao. To remove the challenge to his ideological leadership, Mao first attacked the news media and propaganda agencies of the party during the summer of 1966. At that time, the stress of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was still nominally felt within the party; the 16-point resolution of August, 1966 (which contained the program of the Cultural Revolution), was passed in a heated session of the Central Committee, in a meeting surrounded by army troops and packed by Mao's new shock troops, the Red Guard. In November and December, 1966, these new shock troops, organized and equipped by the army, were directed to attack the Communist party and government leadership throughout the country.

It was at that time that the Soviet party leaders sided with the Chinese party leaders under attack by Mao and his supporters. Mao called Liu Shao-chi "China's Khrushchev" and termed the party leaders "Soviet-style revisionists." The Soviets, in a *Pravda* article of November, 1966, and a Central Committee meeting in December, defended the Chinese party leaders and attacked Mao as a "petit bourgeois fanatic" who was no longer a Communist.

Whether, as Red Guard accusations had it, some Chinese party leaders were in connivance with the Soviet embassy in Peking, and whether or not the Soviets attempted to rescue Liu, the Soviet Communist party

and the Chinese opposition appeared on the same side of the battle. As the attacks against Mao's Chinese opposition mounted, Sino-Soviet incidents increased. Chinese students who created disturbances in the Red Square in Moscow were attacked and on their return to China were received as heroes in Peking. Soviet diplomats and the Soviet embassy in Peking became the victims of organized attacks and demonstrations, and frontier incidents increased at many points on the borders of Sinkiang and Manchuria. Chinese demonstrations, often crude and vulgar, provoked Soviet countermeasures; mutual protests followed.

Frontier incidents, mostly unimportant in themselves, were related to a growing atmosphere of hostility in which the party quarrel was translated into governmental and military confrontations. In Sinkiang, some 60,000 Uighurs escaped from Chinese territory and were received with open arms by the Soviets. In 1969, minor quarrels over islands in the Ussuri and the Amur rivers led to shooting, and large protest movements. The Soviets, worried perhaps about the consolidation of anti-Soviet Maoism in China, strengthened their military forces and assumed an openly hostile position which implied the potential of active Soviet intervention within China. The battle between the regular Communists and the Maoists in China was thus related to the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The Soviets, who found to their dismay that after the 1949 victory communism was not secure in China, sought theoretical explanations. Today's Maoism has been in practice a return to the strategy of revolu-

*(Continued on page 182)*

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*"Considering the impermanence of all alliances, it may well be that the Sino-Pakistani entente will not last long . . . [but] considering the deep emotional and national factors that separate China and Pakistan from India, it is possible that Sino-Pakistani understanding may continue for years to come."*

# China's Relations with India and Pakistan

BY HARISH KAPUR

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DURING THE LAST 20 years, China's relations with India and Pakistan have undoubtedly fluctuated. There was a brief period, after the revolution, when the Chinese Communists adopted a posture of intense militancy toward both nations; there followed a relatively long period of cordiality before a series of events and circumstances led China to forge close links with Pakistan and to break almost all ties with India.

That these perpetual oscillations are a normal feature in the foreign policy of all nations is evident from a study of international relations. However, the factors that determine such fluctuations may differ from one nation to another, depending on the ideological proclivities of the decision-makers, the objectives they have set out in foreign affairs, and the situations (economic, political and international) in which they find themselves.

In the case of the Chinese Communist leaders, who had been isolated for years in the inaccessible caves of Yen-an, it was inevitable that immediately after 1949 their views of the outside world were deeply influenced by theoretical Marxist formulations. But such an attitude did not last long; for within two to three years after the revolution it became increasingly evident that theoretical Marxist influence was significantly diluted by the actions and reactions of other states, by national and strategic considerations, and by constraints imposed by the international situation.

All this was evident in China's changing attitude towards Asia generally, and India and Pakistan particularly. In the immediate aftermath of the Chinese Revolution, the heady wine of victory combined with ideological militancy obviously did not favor an attitude of moderation and reasonableness in Chinese diplomatic behavior. In fact, so virulent and unremittingly hostile was China's attitude to all things non-Communist that she could not rationally evaluate the historic importance of the decolonization that had firmly and irrevocably swept the Asian continent.

The Chinese Communist leadership considered it impossible for any country to attain genuine independence under a non-Communist leadership. In reaching such a conclusion, the Chinese were obviously influenced by Marxist theory. In addition, they were guided by the experience of their country which, under the Nationalist leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, had escalated from one crisis to another, finally degenerating to a position of helplessness and dependence on the outside world. For any empirical observer of Nationalist China, such a traumatic experience would be a convincing proof of the poverty of Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. For the Chinese Communists, it was much more: it was a living example of the poverty of all nationalist leaderships.

With such an outlook, it was hardly possible for Communist China to view with any favor the developments on the Indian sub-

continent; it was hardly possible for her to welcome the peaceful transfer of power to the nationalists in India and Pakistan.

Therefore, apart from establishing diplomatic relations with the two countries—by no means a sign of friendliness—no attempt was made to develop close relations or to seek common ground on issues that could help in the forging of bilateral links. In fact, all the friendly initiatives that emanated from the subcontinent were spurned, and vitriolic attacks—particularly against the Indian leadership—were leveled in the Chinese press.

### REVOLUTIONARY OBJECTIVES

If the traditional tools of diplomacy were relegated to a secondary position, this was not the case so far as revolutionary objectives were concerned. For in the immediate aftermath of the Chinese revolution, appeals to revolt against the existing decision-makers cascaded into the two countries. Chairman Mao Tse-tung personally sent a cable to the Indian Communists, giving them his full support against the Nehru government, and expressing the view that the day was not far off when India, like China, would be liberated by the Communist party from Anglo-American imperialism and its lackeys.<sup>1</sup>

But such a policy was a complete failure. In India, for example, where the Communists had established impressive footholds among the peasants, workers and intellectuals, the feckless revolts led by B. T. Ranadive and Rajeswar Rao—the one centering around the workers and the other around the peasants—plummeted Communist prestige to an all-time low, sharply reducing party membership.

This was a serious setback for China as well as for the Soviet Union. Their capacity for exercising important influence over India and Pakistan had significantly declined. Even the image of communism as a great friend of nationalism (so sedulously projected since the Bolshevik Revolution) was tarnished. On the other hand, responding to the groundswell of nationalism, the nationalist leaders experienced a considerable rise in prestige and popu-

larity. Undoubtedly their influence on the people of their countries was too strong and too deeply rooted to be overthrown by artificially created revolutionary upheavals. Furthermore, the Indian and—to some extent—the Pakistani leaders, having been impressed at some stage of their political lives by the Soviet revolution, had proclaimed their intention of attaining a much more far-reaching socialistic pattern of society than the socialist leaders of many European countries. Obviously, this was a new development which merited objective analysis, instead of a contemptuous and rather thoughtless identification of this socialism with capitalism. The Chinese attitude showed the magnitude of Chinese dogmatism and exposed a lack of the intellectual sophistication needed to understand new trends and new thoughts.

Perhaps even more significant, the combination of these circumstances, resulting from the belligerent line adopted by Peking, did not leave much leeway for India and Pakistan in the actual formulation of their foreign policies. How could they implement their non-aligned policies and develop meaningful relations with all nations—irrespective of political and economic systems—when China, highly vitriolic in her attacks, was not prepared to go beyond the simple establishment of diplomatic relations? Therefore, notwithstanding the repeatedly announced intentions of India and Pakistan to remain nonaligned, both of them moved closer to the United States and Western Europe which, significantly enough, appeared to be more tolerant towards the policies of these countries. Almost the entire economic and military assistance of both countries emanated from the West; and most of their trade was geared to Western markets.

But if India and Pakistan were forced to turn to the West for economic and military support—although they were also increasingly turning against each other—they nonetheless adopted an independent political line on a number of issues. In fact, their line was often contrary to the policy proposed by the West. Both of them, for example, demanded the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and both of them disagreed

<sup>1</sup> V. B. Karnik (editor), *Indian Communist Party Documents, 1930-1956* (Bombay: 1957), p. 48.

—though India perhaps more than Pakistan—with the American determination to brand China as an aggressor during the Korean War.

### PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

The failure of Chinese revolutionary policy—and the manifestation of marked independence by India and Pakistan—did not fail to impress Peking. Very soon it became evident that the Chinese leaders were abandoning the militant line and were relying more and more on diplomacy to counter the United States encirclement and their own isolation.

As a first step in this direction, China systematically cultivated relations with India. Delegates were exchanged; trade was developed; and common ground was sought on issues of international affairs. That India was China's first preference was understandable; for she was the second largest nation in Asia; she had acquired significant international prestige and had declined to hinge her fate with the West. As soon as China adopted the new line, India—who had perforce turned to the West—began to respond favorably to her overtures. India manifested less interest in the West, and appeared eager to institute an element of equilibrium in her relations with the West and China.

The most striking result of the new Chinese policy was the generation of firm opposition to the creation, under United States leadership, of military alliance systems in the area. Many of the nonaligned states—encouraged by Indian opposition—denounced Washington's attempts to create a military bloc, and expressed the view that the formation of such alliances would serve to heighten tension in the area.

If India had become dominant in China's diplomatic calculations, Pakistan was not ignored. Despite Pakistan's decision to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization ((SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact, China took steps to forge closer links. Although Peking's

official reaction was obviously critical of Pakistan's decision to hinge her fate with the West, it was nonetheless in sharp contrast to the vitriolic outburst from Moscow. In fact, the Chinese government did not send any protest to Karachi, and Pakistan was not singled out for derogatory comments by the Chinese leaders and newspapers. At the Bandung Conference (1955), the Chinese Premier actually went to the extent of accepting Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali's assurances that his country would not be involved in any conflict that might be unleashed by the United States against China. Relations between the two countries thus continued to develop on an even keel. Trade was increased and an increasing number of cultural delegations were exchanged. Mutual state visits were also made by the leaders of the two countries. The 12-day visit to China of the Pakistani Prime Minister, H. S. Surawardhy, in October, 1956, was made an important occasion for giving him a tremendous ovation. The joint communiqué that was issued at the end of the visit recognized "the need for the development of commercial and cultural relations" and recorded the fact that "there is no conflict of interests between the two countries."<sup>2</sup>

Why did China adopt a remarkably sober and moderate attitude? Why did the Chinese accept Pakistan's assurances? First of all, the Chinese knew that Pakistan had joined SEATO not because she had any special reason to fear Chinese communism or because she had any serious difficulties with Peking. For the Pakistani decision-makers, increasing differences with India were far more important and far more real than the relatively nonexistent danger of communism; and the potential danger of military complications with India appeared to be more real than complications with China or the Soviet Union.

Second, the Chinese were probably aware that Pakistan was not too deeply involved in the defense arrangements contemplated under SEATO. With the exception of the modest role of the Pakistani navy, no Pakistani troops had participated in SEATO military exercises in spite of the fact that Pakistan maintained

<sup>2</sup> K. Sarwar Hasan, *Documents on Foreign Relations of Pakistan; China, India and Pakistan* (Karachi, 1966), p. 363.



a larger defense establishment than either the Philippines or Thailand.

It is therefore not surprising that China decided to maintain a measure of flexibility in her diplomatic relations with both India and Pakistan. This was especially evident in her stand on Kashmir. While privately assuring India that she understood and appreciated the Indian position on the Kashmir issue, she publicly abstained from supporting one side against the other, and expressed the hope that the two countries would settle the issue peacefully.

However, China's efforts to maintain an equilibrium with the two countries were severely racked by a number of developments in the late 1950's. A military coup d'état in 1959 in Pakistan led the new leadership to opt for closer relations with the West, and to sign a bilateral military agreement on March 5 of the same year, which spoke of the leaders' "determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect."<sup>3</sup>

Collaterally, difficulties also began to arise between China and India. The Tibetan revolt in March, 1959, was attributed to Indian instigation. An unusually long editorial in the *People's Daily* on May 6, 1959, criticized Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for his views on Tibet. And for the first time, the entire boundary alignment between India and China was questioned, with China laying sudden claim to about 50,000 square miles of what the Indians considered to be a part of their country.

An unusually difficult situation had thus arisen for Peking. But this was only a ripple in comparison to the serious difficulties that China concurrently began to face internally and externally. Internally, the difficult period of the Great Leap Forward had been inaugurated. Externally, difficulties had begun to arise with many countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union. The development of such a situation in the case of any major power would have been charac-

terized as serious. For China, it was disastrous, since she did not have the military power and economic strength to stand on her feet.

As far as the Indian subcontinent was concerned, the situation was further aggravated for China by the Pakistani decision formally to propose to India to forge a joint defense policy in the face of the Chinese threat. Obviously, this was an important proposal and would have rendered the Chinese position even more difficult, had India accepted it. But considering the difficulties that existed in the relations between the two countries, India refused. The escalation of tension within the India-China-Pakistan triangle had undoubtedly created a new situation, generating new strains in the area. Although the situation had by no means attained an explosive level, it was nonetheless serious enough to cause concern.

Interestingly enough, Pakistan was the first country to manifest interest in reexamining her policy and extricating herself from what was undoubtedly a difficult situation. Evidently, none of the foreign policy objectives, for which the nation's leadership had made concessions to the West, had been attained.

In the first place, Pakistan had been unable to obtain unconditional and complete support from the United States on the Kashmir question—an issue which had dominated the nation's foreign policy since 1947. Admittedly, there is evidence to suggest that the Western powers were perhaps more sympathetic to Pakistan's point of view, but it would be nonetheless difficult to produce evidence of complete Western support of all that Pakistan did and wished to do to attain her objectives in Kashmir.

Second, Washington had begun to consider India as an important and pivotal country in Asia; and the United States therefore considered it important to strengthen India as an effective bulwark against any further expansion of Chinese influence in the area. Pakistan was particularly aggrieved by the fact that the United States was making a special effort to persuade other members of the aid-India consortium to match United States

<sup>3</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, D.C.: March, 1959), pp. 416-18.

efforts, whereas in the case of Pakistan "all sorts of objections were raised."<sup>4</sup>

Third, the worsening situation on the Sino-Indian border led to the generation of fear among Pakistani leaders that the nondemarcation of Pakistan's frontier with China might lead to serious friction between the two countries, as it had done in the case of India and China. In fact, minor incidents had already occurred on the Sino-Pakistani border. Reports of a few flare-ups had appeared in the Chinese press and unidentified planes, presumably Chinese, had intruded into Pakistani territory.

### SINO-PAKISTANI ENTENTE

When all this became apparent—and this happened in 1959—Pakistan showed firm signs of cautious disengagement, without of course severing or weakening her ties with the Western bloc. She signed economic agreements with Yugoslavia, Poland and the Soviet Union, and made attempts to develop closer political ties with some of the nonaligned countries.

However, the most important initiative taken by Pakistan was toward the normalization of relations with China. In the autumn of 1959, a proposal was made to Peking to open negotiations to demarcate the undefined border between the two countries. From the evidence that is available, it would appear that this demarche placed Peking on the horns of a dilemma. Although Chinese leaders were eager to keep the door open for eventual negotiations with Pakistan, and perhaps even to use them to obtain border concessions from India, they did not wish to begin formal negotiations, because such a step would aggravate tension between China and India. Therefore, while continuing informal talks, they avoided open negotiations. Even when Pakistan submitted detailed proposals in May, 1961, the Chinese prudently stated that they would submit a detailed reply in the near future.

Such a prudent attitude, however, did not

last long; the situation in the area changed, necessitating a change in Peking's attitude towards Pakistan. In the first place, Sino-Indian relations had worsened as a result of the border conflict. By the spring of 1962, all hope of an agreement had been eliminated. The negotiations concerning the border had become hopelessly deadlocked; clashes had become more frequent; and the whole gamut of relations had been reduced to a simple exchange of harsh diplomatic notes full of mutual recrimination concerning border violations.

Second, with the partial disengagement of Pakistan from the West, Moscow had begun to show signs of interest in that country. Although support was still extended to India on all issues that separated her from Pakistan, it was nonetheless evident that much of the old Soviet militancy against the Pakistani leaders had been abandoned. Soviet attacks on Pakistan for her complicity in the U-2 incident had slowly disappeared from the Soviet press. The broadcasts beamed from Moscow Radio against Pakistan were toned down. An offer of unconditional economic assistance was made, and a five-year contract for the supply of Soviet equipment and experts for oil and gas exploitation had been signed.

It is reasonable to assume that the combination of these factors probably induced Peking to abandon its self-imposed restraint as far as its relations with Pakistan were concerned. On May 3, 1962, the two governments announced simultaneously in their respective capitals that they had agreed to conduct negotiations to demarcate the border between China's Sinkiang province and the contiguous areas of Hunza and Gilgit, the defense of which was under Pakistan's control. On October 20, formal negotiations began.

### THE SINO-INDIAN WAR

While the negotiations were under way, the Sino-Indian war exploded, leading to the defeat of India. It was perhaps the unexpected explosion of this event and the tragic exposure of India's military weakness that induced the Chinese to conclude an agreement rapidly

<sup>4</sup> Field Marshal Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements, July 1961-June 1962*, Vol. 4 (Karachi: 1963), pp. 5-6.

with Pakistan. By doing so, they were able to project an image of a reasonable nation seeking peaceful solutions to some of her ticklish problems.

If China were impelled to accelerate the Sino-Pakistani negotiations for the reasons mentioned above, Pakistan perhaps was led in the same direction by the decision of London and Washington to send prompt military assistance to India. The Pakistanis were not at all impressed by the Western assertion that the Chinese attacks on India represented a threat to the whole subcontinent. For them, India was still the enemy, whatever China might do; and the fact that India was receiving military assistance from the West probably catalyzed the Pakistani decision to normalize relations with Peking.

Thus, when the Indo-Pakistani negotiations (December 27, 1962) were to open in Rawalpindi on the Kashmir question—negotiations brought about by Western pressure—the governments of China and Pakistan announced “an agreement in principle” on the alignment of the border between Sinkiang and that part of Kashmir which was controlled by Pakistan. Detailed negotiations then opened and finally culminated in an agreement on March 2, 1963, setting forth the exact border alignment between the two countries.<sup>5</sup>

A number of other agreements were also concluded. The most important pertained to the development of trade and the establishment of civil aviation links between the two countries. An understanding was also reached on a number of international issues which concerned both countries. Peking rallied to Pakistan's point of view on Kashmir by accepting the idea of a referendum in that area. Pakistan continued to support China's admission to the United Nations, and both nations publicly expressed the view that a second Afro-Asian conference ought to be convened.

Perhaps the most striking development in Sino-Pakistani relations was the generation of wide consensus in Pakistan that a military understanding with China—and against India—had become necessary. On April 26, 1963, the important Pakistani newspaper, *Dawn*, proposed that the Pakistani government should conclude a military agreement with China and discard her “faithless Christian allies.”<sup>6</sup> In July of the same year, Pakistani President Ayub Khan warned the West that if it continued to reinforce the sinews of Indian military strength, smaller Asian nations would be compelled to seek Chinese protection.<sup>7</sup> Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went even further and, in fact, implied that his country had the protection of China. He said:

This much we know and can say that if, God forbid, we should be involved in a clash with India, that is, if India were, in its frustration, to turn its guns against Pakistan, the international position being what it is, Pakistan would not be alone. That conflict would not involve Pakistan only. An attack by India on Pakistan would no longer confine the stakes to the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia.<sup>8</sup>

Two days after Bhutto's speech, the Press Association of Pakistan circulated a news item announcing that Pakistan would seek the assistance of Chinese experts for training in guerrilla warfare.<sup>9</sup> And in Peking, the Chinese government assured a visiting Pakistani delegation that China would be ready to give “all possible help” and material support to Pakistan “at all times.”<sup>10</sup>

It is inevitable that the appearance of such declarations has given rise to a spate of rumors concerning the possible existence of a secret military understanding between Pakistan and China. Whether this is true it is difficult to say with any exactitude. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that considering the continuous escalation of tension in which Pakistan and China were directly but separately involved, the two countries may have reached an oral understanding concerning the type of coordinated actions they

<sup>5</sup> K. Sarwan Hasan, *op. cit.*, pp. 377–383.

<sup>6</sup> *Dawn* (Karachi), April 26, 1963.

<sup>7</sup> *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), July 21, 1963.

<sup>8</sup> K. Sarwan Hasan, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

<sup>9</sup> H. Ray, “Sino-Pakistan Relation” *Internationale Spectator*, (November 22, 1966), p. 1564.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1565.

would take in the event of either nation's embroilment with India.

The events that followed the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 seem to confirm this hypothesis. During the initial stage of the war, when Pakistan appeared to be achieving her objective of encircling and detaching Kashmir from the rest of India, Peking maintained a studied silence. But when the Indian counteroffensive, launched at the heart of Pakistan, changed the tide of war, Peking came out in full support of Pakistan and threatened India with dire consequences if she continued her "aggression" against Pakistan.<sup>11</sup> As the Indian forces poised for a further push toward the important cities of Lahore and Sialkot, the Chinese began military activity on the northern frontier and sent a 48-hour ultimatum (subsequently extended another 48 hours) asking India to remove bunkers from the Chinese side allegedly constructed by India.<sup>12</sup>

The ultimatum, however, was never put into effect. The belligerents in the meantime had accepted a cease-fire, and the United States, through the periodic meetings with China in Warsaw, had frankly asked the Chinese representative to stay out of the conflict. Otherwise, the United States representative implied, the United States and other members of the United Nations would retaliate against China.<sup>13</sup> It would be difficult to discover whether the Chinese threats had really been coordinated with Pakistan, and whether they would have been carried through, had the cease-fire not intervened.

In any event, the veiled threats contained in some of the Pakistani declarations combined with the Chinese ultimatum served a definite purpose. Many Indian decision-makers were led to believe in the existence of a limited Sino-Pakistani military understanding, thus removing the military advantage that India had over Pakistan, and giving Pakistan an element of security for which she

had been striving since her foundation as an independent state.

China's policy toward South Asia has gone through a number of momentous fluctuations. Alternating between policies of belligerence and friendliness, in the early 1960's China finally adopted a posture of cordiality toward Pakistan and a posture of intense militancy towards India.

Undoubtedly, a number of factors must have dictated these fluctuations. But from the available evidence, it would seem that— notwithstanding the Marxist orientation of the Chinese leaders—strategic and national considerations were preponderant. The aggravation of tension and conflict with India was due to border differences and the potential challenge the Indian leadership could offer to China in Asia. And the forging of close links with the Islamic state of Pakistan, following the Sino-Indian dispute, was doubtless due to the fact that Pakistan appeared to be a potential ally of China in her dispute against India.

The Sino-Pakistani entente undoubtedly offers some advantages to both countries. To weak and relatively vulnerable Pakistan, which has been searching for national security since her independence, it gives an element of security against India. And to China the entente has offered some assurance against any military initiative emanating from the Indian side of the Sino-Indian border. The Sino-Pakistani understanding, however, has not made it possible for China and Pakistan to compel India to yield ground on unresolved issues. This is not because India is in a position to withstand joint pressure, but because the recent development of a Soviet-American detente on some international issues has encouraged the superpowers to forestall any attempt to upset the existing status quo on the subcontinent.

## FUTURE OUTLOOK


How long all this will continue is of course uncertain. Considering the impermanence of all alliances, it may well be that the Sino-Pakistani entente will not last long. On the other hand, considering the deep emotional

<sup>11</sup> *Peking Review* (Peking), September 10, 1965.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, September 24, 1965.

<sup>13</sup> Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* (London: 1968), p. 373.





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and national factors that separate China and Pakistan from India, it is possible that Sino-Pakistani understanding may continue for years to come. In any event, one thing is certain: in the face of the growing Sino-Pakistani understanding, India is unable to defend herself, and must increasingly rely on the United States and the Soviet Union. Happily for India, these superpowers have made stability on the subcontinent one of their principal objectives in Asia.

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*"The Cultural Revolution in mainland China, which began in 1966, has made inroads into every phase of Chinese life. Its impact on the rest of Asia has been considerable."*

## China and Southeast Asia

BY STEPHEN C. Y. PAN

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CHINESE IMMIGRATION, commercial interests and cultural influences in Southeast Asia date back several hundred years, and the overseas, ethnic Chinese have long played an important role in all aspects of the economic, social, cultural and political life of that region.

Chinese Communists began working underground in Southeast Asia in 1924 or 1925. Their efforts increased during World War II, and after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Peking's influence became increasingly apparent. The Chinese Communists hoped to exploit the Chinese who were living in other Asian countries, but they discovered that they could not rely on the overseas Chinese as an instrument of policy. Communism is contradictory to the inherited Chinese cultural pattern, and the ethnic Chinese are primarily interested not in politics but in personal and family security. Facing this reality, Peking's policies have become more flexible, and its strategy and tactics have changed according to circumstances.

The Cultural Revolution in mainland China, which began in 1966, has made inroads into every phase of Chinese life. Its impact on the rest of Asia has been considerable. The revolution advocates:

Opposition to old thought, culture, customs and habits; the establishment of new thought, culture, customs and habits; an end to imperialism and revisionism.

Imperialism and revisionism were attacked within China and abroad. The first foreign targets were the Portuguese colony of Macao and the British colony of Hong Kong. On Tai-pa, a tiny island off Macao, Chinese residents began to build a school without obtaining a construction permit. When Macao police moved in to stop the work, the consequent fighting resulted in injury to 23 people. After the Tai-pa incident, in November, 1966, Chinese Communists demonstrated and rioted in Macao and members of the youthful Red Guards ransacked the Governor's office. Rioting and demonstrations occurred sporadically throughout December, and in January, 1967, Macao's newly appointed Governor Jose Nobre de Carvalho capitulated to Peking's demands. Compensation was paid to Communist China and a number of anti-Communists were deported.

Having successfully intimidated the Portuguese in Macao, the Chinese Communists went to work in Hong Kong and Kowloon in 1967. Bus drivers went on strike; arson was common; stores were plundered; police stations were attacked and bombed. The disorders continued from June to September, 1967. London and Peking exchanged protests. British newspapermen were arrested in Peking. British property in mainland China was vandalized. British ships were seized in Chinese waters. With London's approval, the British authorities in Hong Kong imposed a curfew and ordered "all necessary measures

to maintain peace and security.” Combined British and Hong Kong Chinese efforts prevented a Communist takeover of Hong Kong and Kowloon.

In 1967, Communist China’s anti-foreign activities were extended to many Asian nations. Two Indian diplomats were arrested at the Summer Palace near Peking, accused of taking photographs and of “espionage.” In September, Peking’s troops opened fire on Indian army positions in Sikkim, and the heaviest fighting since 1962 occurred. To its list of such declared enemies as the United States, Soviet Russia and India, Peking also added Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia and Indonesia.

Burma countered by denouncing Peking’s subversive activities. Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk closed two pro-Peking newspapers in September, 1967, and declared that Chinese Communist subversion aimed at the overthrow of his government.<sup>1</sup> On September 15, 1967, the Indonesian embassy in Peking was closed by Adam Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister. Peking, of course, blamed Jakarta for the worsening situation. The Soviet embassy in Peking was also picketed and attacked during 1967. Rioters smashed furniture and set fire to the Soviet consulate. Chinese Communist demonstrations occurred at Lenin’s tomb in Moscow. In addition, Outer Mongolia’s embassy in Peking was besieged by the Red Guards.

In reaction to the Cultural Revolution, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia became much less sympathetic to Peking. From 1966 to 1968, they greatly decreased the amounts of money sent to their families inside China, fearing that the money might not reach its intended destination, and might cause further trouble for their relatives.

<sup>1</sup> In June, 1969, Prince Sihanouk announced that he was willing to resume diplomatic relations with the United States, broken in 1965. Later, he stated that he had received a written pledge from Hanoi that as soon as the war in Vietnam was terminated, North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces would be withdrawn from Cambodia. Actual resumption of diplomatic relations between Cambodia and the United States occurred in the first week of July, 1969.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Pan and Daniel Lyons, *Vietnam Crisis* (New York: Twin Circle Publishing Co., 1967), p. 22.

## THE WAR IN VIETNAM

When North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh attended the inauguration of the People’s Republic of China in Peking on October 1, 1949, he asked Chairman Mao Tse-tung for more aid to continue his fight with the French. In 1950, the Chinese sent Lo Kwei-po<sup>2</sup> of Marshal Lin Piao’s staff to advise Ho Chi Minh. Hundreds of Chinese Communist cadres, officers, experts and technicians went to Hanoi, and Peking supplied North Vietnam with arms and food. Troops of Mao Tse-tung’s army were stationed on Vietnam’s borders. Under the direction of Vo Nguyen Giap, Hanoi’s Minister of Defense and a follower of Mao Tse-tung, Hanoi’s forces defeated the French at Dien-bienphu in May, 1954. Each year since then Hanoi has sent hundreds of party cadres and officers to Peking for further training in “revolutionary experience” and for practice in guerrilla warfare. Since 1960, Peking has built several airports in Kwangsi, Kwangtung and Yunnan provinces which are adjacent to Vietnam and could provide Hanoi with air sanctuary.

After the Tonkin Gulf incident on August 2 and 4, 1964 (when North Vietnam reportedly launched attacks on the United States warships *C. Turner Joy* and *Maddox*), Peking increased its aid in personnel and material to Hanoi. From 1965 to the present, before every important political and military move made by Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh has sent high party representatives to Peking for advice. Ho, however, is careful not to antagonize Moscow, from whom he still gets most of his anti-aircraft and combat planes. Most light arms come from Communist China. Many North Vietnamese party leaders like Prime Minister Phan Van Dong and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap were trained in Yenan during World War II. Some of this cooperation dates back to the 1930’s, when Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communists set up the “Kiangsi Soviet.”

It is difficult to ascertain the exact amount of aid given to Hanoi by Peking. According to intelligence reports from Saigon and Taipei, it has been estimated that Communist

China has sent about 50,000 party cadres and military officers to South Vietnam. There are also thousands of Chinese Communist experts and technicians in communications, transportation, armament, medicine, propaganda, subversion and intelligence who have hidden in North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government formed by the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam in July, 1969, was recognized by Peking and Moscow within two days. This made truce arrangements in Vietnam even more complicated. Moreover, Peking's Vice Premier Li Hsin-nien subsequently urged the Vietnamese Communists to continue fighting until they achieve a battlefield victory. He declared:

We heartily hope that after its establishment the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam will further encourage and mobilize the people of South Vietnam to hold high the banner of the war against the United States aggression and for national salvation and deal hard blows to the United States imperialists and their running dogs to complete victory.<sup>3</sup>

### THAILAND'S FEARS

Long before the policy of gradual United States withdrawal from Vietnam was made official by President Richard Nixon on June 18, 1969, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia were concerned by the situation in Asia. The underground "Provisional Revolutionary Government of Thailand" constantly threatens Bangkok. Intensification of subversive activities and guerrilla warfare, encouraged by Communist triumphs in Vietnam, may lead to a "war of liberation" in Thailand. The Chief of Staff of Thailand's Supreme Command, Air Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, has said that "Thailand might become a new target of Communist aggression after the Vietnam War" and has noted that there are "indications that the Communists planned to move southward to Thailand."<sup>4</sup>

In fact, as early as 1962, when there was a fear of a Communist takeover in Laos, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman issued a joint communiqué (March 6, 1962) stating that the United States would defend Thailand against direct aggression without waiting for "prior agreement" with other allies in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In May, 1969, while visiting Bangkok, Secretary of State William P. Rogers reaffirmed the terms of the Rusk-Thanat communiqué but advised the Thai government not to expect "the same speed and intensity" of response to some of Thailand's security problems that she would have received in the early 1960's. In July, 1969, the State Department admitted that a secret commitment was made by the United States sometime between 1963 and 1967 "to help defend Thailand."

Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia said in May, 1969, that the race riots which broke out in Malaysia that month were largely instigated and supported by Chinese Communists. Later he modified this to say only that the Chinese Communists supported the riots. Peking ignored both charges but denounced the Rahman government for being "anti-Chinese." Only by proclaiming martial law and using force to suppress the riots was the situation brought under control. However, it will be difficult to restore racial harmony in Malaysia.

Singapore, close to Malaysia, with the majority of her population of Chinese origin, was naturally jittery about the infiltration and penetration of Chinese Communists through Malaysia. She closed her borders adjacent to Malaysia and imposed a curfew and strict laws against rioting.

Singapore has no diplomatic relations with Peking, but the Bank of China, which has been permitted to function, has become the center of subversive and propaganda activities. Accused in June, 1969, of violating a Singapore banking law which requires the bank to keep 20 per cent of its capital to meet current demands from customers, the bank was fined the equivalent of \$41,000,

<sup>3</sup> *The New York Times*, July 10, 1969.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*



which it refused to pay. The Singapore government ordered the bank's activities suspended. Retaliating economically, Peking decreed that no money could be sent to Singapore except through the Bank of China. Relations between Peking and Singapore have steadily worsened.

### "CONTAINMENT" OF PEKING

Communist China's policy of defeating United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism in Southeast Asia has had other repercussions. Moscow is now endeavoring to deter Peking's expansionist policies. On June 7, 1969, Leonid I. Brezhnev, Secretary of the Soviet party, told the Communist summit conference: "We are of the opinion that the course of events is putting on the agenda the collective security in Asia." Shortly afterward, most Soviet diplomats in Asian and Pacific nations were called home for consultation.<sup>5</sup> Moscow's attempt to check Peking's expansionist policies in Asia is also intended to increase its own influence while reducing United States influence in Asia and the Pacific.

As early as May and June, 1969, the official Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* urged a collective system in Asia in order to deter Mao Tse-tung's "hegemonistic pretension." Actually, the Soviet Union has tried for almost three years to improve cultural, economic and political relations with Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines. In September, 1968, Moscow sent a newspaperman to Nationalist China, and a favorable report was made on Taiwan.

The Soviet project to contain Communist China has aroused interest in Asian capitals. India welcomed Moscow's proposal for regional cooperation in East Asia but expressed reservations about an Asian collective security system. India's traditional neutralist policy makes New Delhi reluctant to join a military alliance.

<sup>5</sup> Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko addressed the Supreme Soviet on June 10, 1969, commenting favorably on the possibilities of a Moscow-inspired collective security system in Asia.

<sup>6</sup> *Peking Review* (Peking), July 4, 1969, p. 22.

Afghanistan and Nepal are interested in the Soviet project but they have not yet expressed an official opinion on the subject of an alliance.

The Soviet plan of "collective security" and the "containment policy" of former United States Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles have interesting similarities. Moscow will try to keep some Asian nations free from Peking's domination and will also try to counteract United States influence in the area. Moscow may also want the Warsaw Pact nations to cooperate with such Asian allies as North Korea, North Vietnam and Outer Mongolia.

On June 28, 1969, *Hsinhua* (official Chinese news agency) was quoted in Tokyo as stating that Peking denounced the Soviet proposal for a security alignment of Asian nations as "an anti-Chinese military alliance," and "something Russia picked up from the garbage heap of the late John Foster Dulles." Peking further intensified its attack by labeling the Soviet move as "Soviet Revisionism's Tattered Flag" and said that it "will surely go down in shameful defeat."<sup>6</sup> Regardless of Peking's opposition, at a conference for its diplomats in early July, 1969, the Japanese government discussed the Soviet proposal. And United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers said in Washington on July 2 that he was interested in the Soviet idea of collective security in Asia.

### AUSTRALIA AND OTHER NATIONS

Because of the proposed withdrawal of British forces from East of Suez in 1971 and the probable United States withdrawal from

(Continued on page 180)

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*Discussing various alternative solutions to the problem of Taiwan, this author points out that the legal status of Taiwan is still undecided and that, in the words of President Harry S. Truman, "determination of [this] status must await the restoration of security in the Pacific . . . or consideration by the United Nations."*

## Taiwan and the "Two Chinas"

BY PETER P. CHENG

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THE IMPASSE over the status of Taiwan reflects the basic conflict between Nationalist and Communist Chinese. To Peking, Taiwan has been a prime symbol of United States hostility and interference in Chinese domestic affairs. To the Nationalists, the island has been a last base from which to press their claim to be the legal government of all China and to talk of a return to the mainland.

Each China has consistently asserted that she constitutes the government of all China and that Taiwan is simply a province of China. This is based on ancient historical connections, on the predominantly Chinese ethnic origin of the population, and on the Cairo Declaration<sup>1</sup> which stipulated that "Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China." Since the outbreak of war in Korea on June 25, 1950, support for the Nationalist Chinese government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the defense of Taiwan have been two fundamental elements of United States China policy, symbols of the United States determination to "contain" the Chinese Communists.

On June 27, 1950, President Harry S. Truman sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits to prevent a Communist attack on Taiwan. On December 2, 1954, the United States signed a mutual defense treaty with

Nationalist China promising to help defend the island against Communist attack. In January, 1955, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack." Billions of dollars have been spent, military equipment has been supplied and training assistance has been rendered to build the defense capacity of the island. In the offshore islands crises of 1955 and 1958, the United States extended necessary assistance to Nationalist China to frustrate the Chinese Communist effort to seize these islands by force.

In spite of the Nationalist Chinese aspiration to go back to the mainland, the United States has never intended to help the Nationalists attack Communist China. It is widely believed that President Truman's dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits was aimed not merely at stopping Communist aggression against Taiwan but also at restraining the Nationalist Chinese from waging an attack against the mainland. In a December 10, 1954, exchange of notes on the mutual defense treaty, Nationalist China yielded a degree of her sovereignty to the United States when the United States successfully held the Nationalists in leash by means of an agreement that "offensive mili-

<sup>1</sup> November, 1943.

tary operations by either party from the territories held by the Republic of China would be undertaken only as a matter of joint agreement."<sup>2</sup> Thus no military operation against the mainland can be undertaken without the prior consent of the United States. In October, 1958, after a three-day conference with United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the offshore islands crisis, Chiang Kai-shek renounced the use of force for the recovery of the mainland. In June, 1962, in order to allay mounting tension in the Taiwan Straits, President John F. Kennedy stressed United States opposition to the use of force by both Communists and Nationalists. In January, 1967, the State Department reportedly discouraged the Nationalists' eagerness to take advantage of political turmoil by invading mainland China. Without United States support, the Nationalist aspiration to go back to the mainland becomes unattainable.

By placing the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, the United States has created a de facto separation between mainland China and Taiwan and has been able to preserve a shaky cease-fire in the area without a final political settlement. Although Peking has consistently rejected United States proposals for immediate renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits, it has been pursuing its "liberation" policy cautiously, avoiding direct military confrontation with the United States. Since the Bandung Conference in 1955, Peking has not considered force to be the most effective means of securing Taiwan. Much effort has been directed toward the accomplishment of "liberation" through diplomacy and propaganda. Behind the policy of liberation through diplomacy have been Communist China's efforts to prevent the Taiwan question from becoming an international issue. Thus Peking can defeat any foreign effort to separate the island from

China and can justify keeping the United States out of the area. In general, Communist propaganda aims at four targets:

In the first category, Peking includes all countries in the world, but its message is rather specifically directed toward the so-called uncommitted countries. Its purpose is to convince them that Formosa is an integral part of China, that her claim over the island is therefore just and right, that hence she is entitled to their diplomatic support. In the second category, propaganda aimed at the mainland Chinese, the message is designed to educate the masses to believe that the inhabitants of Formosa are their "brethren" and that the liberation of Formosans is their inalienable right and duty. To the Nationalist Chinese in Formosa, Peking appeals for "patriotism" and "cooperation" in the unification of the island with their fatherland. And, last, to the Formosans, Red China emphasizes that once they are united with China they can enjoy "full autonomy."<sup>3</sup>

While the impasse continues, Chiang Kai-shek depends on the slogan of a return to the mainland to maintain his illegal, undemocratic regime in Taiwan and to claim to represent China's sole and legitimate government. He and his followers are aware that a return to the mainland is not possible unless there is a war between the United States and Communist China in Asia. The troops under Chiang's control are only a defensive force. Their existence depends entirely on United States military aid and the aim of this aid is to maintain the United States defense perimeter in the Pacific. For this reason, Chiang's troops can obtain only defensive weapons. Taiwan is economically incapable of supporting a counterattack operation. Above all, more than 80 per cent of the rank and file troops are native Taiwanese. Remembering the February 28, 1947, incident in which more than 20,000 Taiwanese leaders were massacred, it would be foolish to expect these Taiwanese soldiers to risk their lives for Chiang's return to the mainland. Nevertheless, the myth that "Taiwan is China" continues to receive support from 62 member-states of the United Nations, including the United States.

The Chinese Communists have constantly demanded the withdrawal of United States

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Report on Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of China*, Executive Report No. 2, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Peter P. C. Cheng, "The Formosan Tangle: A Formosan's View," *Asian Survey*, November, 1967, p. 792.

protection from Taiwan as a precondition to improving relations with Washington. Although they do not expect United States withdrawal from Taiwan in the foreseeable future, they seem confident that either Taiwan will come under their control when their military strength is strong enough to challenge the United States Fleet in the Taiwan Strait or the Chiang regime on Taiwan will become disenchanted with Washington and will seek an understanding with Peking. At present, they show no willingness to reconcile Peking-Washington relations at the risk of prejudicing their claims to Taiwan. As long as the island is under Chiang's control, they will try to obtain all possible political benefits out of the existing impasse.

In many respects, Taiwan is, as Professor Robert A. Scalapino put it, "a living symbol of the great American dilemma . . . how to fulfill the awesome responsibilities of being a global power, entrusted with the defense of many societies, and at the same time, remain faithful to the principles that constitute our political-ethical creed."<sup>4</sup> Any hope that the problem will resolve itself, given time, is based on the assumption that a gradual Taiwanization of the government will result from the emergence of a second generation born on the island to Nationalist Chinese parents. However, such a solution is practical only if the Nationalist Chinese are willing to merge with the Taiwanese majority in an independent nation. This condition is not yet at hand, nor even in sight. After the death of Chiang Kai-shek, it is almost certain that his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, will take over the Kuomintang regime and continue its minority government by means of totalitarian control on the island.

The regime has dealt ruthlessly with Taiwanese who have demanded more political freedom. The regime treated this demand as treason. Lei Chen in 1960, Su Tung-chi in 1962, Peng Ming-min in 1965, and Hwang Chi-ming in 1966 became the victims of the regime's brutality. Although local elections continued, Chiang Ching-kuo's agents kept

attentive eyes on personalities and election procedures. Anyone found objectionable to the regime at any level was labeled "pro-Communist" or "corrupt" and arrested. At the national level, since 1949, the regime has abrogated all national electoral procedures except for the selection of the President, who is not elected by popular vote. Having paralyzed political opposition and political machinery, the regime has no fear of being challenged from within by peaceful processes.

The cleavage between the Nationalist Chinese and the Taiwanese is not reconcilable. The regime fears any reconciliation of the two groups. When Lei Chen sought to unify the Taiwanese and the Nationalist Chinese and to establish the China Democratic party as an anti-Communist democratic political opposition to the Kuomintang in August, 1960, the regime imprisoned him on the charge of sedition. He was found guilty by a military court and sentenced to ten years in prison. Simultaneously, the regime seized his magazine, *Free China*, along with *Kung Lun-pao*, the opposition journal on the island.

The cleavage will deepen as Taiwanese businessmen compete with Nationalist Chinese businessmen, and as the number of Taiwanese unemployed increases because the regime installs its own favorites in government positions. Although politically explosive conditions exist on the island, the regime's tight secret police organizations, controlled press, concentration camps and armed forces make the Taiwanese appear politically passive.

### THE TWO-CHINA PROPOSAL

As a way out of the Taiwan impasse, the "two-China" solution was proposed by Arthur J. Goldberg, the former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, in a *Washington Post* article of September 12, 1968. He proposed that the United States Representative to the United Nations be authorized to state in the 23d General Assembly session that "the United States will not oppose the admission of representatives of Peking to this Assembly, provided that

<sup>4</sup> George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. ix.



continued representation of the Republic of China in this Assembly and in the United Nations is assured."<sup>5</sup> He continued:

If Peking accepts this arrangement, which is not likely at present, I believe also that the United States should support a change under which mainland China would sit in the Security Council. Whether Peking accepts this arrangement or not, we should stand steadfast against the efforts of Peking and its friends to expel Taiwan from the U.N. Until Peking accepts a two-China policy, we should also continue our insistence that the Republic of China retain the Chinese seat in the Security Council.<sup>6</sup>

A "two-China" policy along these lines was advocated by a distinguished panel of experts under the auspices of the United Nations Association, an independent, non-partisan organization in the United States. In October, 1966, in September, 1967, and in September, 1968, the panel urged that the United States adopt a "two-China" policy, permitting representation of both Communist China and Nationalist China in the United Nations, with Communist China taking a Security Council seat. The panel also warned that if the United States continued to oppose the entry of Communist China, the General Assembly might vote Nationalist China out of the organization and assign China's seat to the Communist regime. To save Nationalist China's membership, the panel said, the United States should promptly adopt a "two-China" policy.

Both Ambassador Goldberg and the panel

were aware of the fact that under present leadership Peking would "castigate" the proposal, because the Communist Chinese had said they would never accept the right of Taiwan to United Nations membership. However, it was felt that the proposal might have a different reaction once a new leadership generation took over in Peking. The merit of the proposal at this moment is, as Ambassador Goldberg put it, to "make clear to the world community that it is Peking and not Washington that is keeping mainland China out of the U.N."<sup>7</sup>

At the 21st United Nations General Assembly session in 1966, a plan had been suggested in concrete terms by Canadian External Affairs Minister Paul Martin: Communist China was to replace Nationalist China as a permanent member of the Security Council and both countries were to be represented in the General Assembly. Martin qualified his suggestion as an "interim solution" pending the settlement of the jurisdictional dispute between the rival regimes.<sup>8</sup> The plan was not put in the form of a draft resolution because a rejection by the General Assembly would have ended discussion of the plan.

However, a modified and more ambiguously worded plan was outlined in a formal draft resolution by Italy in 1966 and in the succeeding two sessions in 1967 and 1968. The Italian resolution, cosponsored by Belgium, Luxembourg, Iceland and Chile in 1968,<sup>9</sup> called for the establishment of a committee with the mandate to explore the situation in all its aspects and to make appropriate recommendations for an equitable and practical solution to the question of the representation of China in the United Nations.<sup>10</sup> Specifically, this committee would determine whether Peking wished to be represented in the United Nations and, if so, whether it would abide by the United Nations Charter. In the event of an affirmative reply to these questions, the committee would determine the position of the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan.

The proposed resolution was defeated in the three consecutive General Assembly ses-

<sup>5</sup> *The Washington Post*, September 12, 1968, p. A12.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> On the Canadian statement, see U. N. General Assembly Provisional Verbatim Record, 21st Sess., Plenary 2-17 (A/PV. 1475) (23 Nov. 1966).

<sup>9</sup> The Italian Resolution was cosponsored by Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Trinidad and Tobago in 1966, and by Belgium, Chile, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in 1967.

<sup>10</sup> The vote on the Italian resolution was as follows:

	For	Against		
1966	34 (28.1%)	62 (51.2%)		
1967	32 (26.2%)	57 (46.7%)		
1968	30 (23.8%)	67 (53.2%)		
	Abstain	Absent	Not Voting	
1966	25 (20.7%)	0	0	
1967	30 (24.5%)	3 (2.6%)	0	
1968	27 (22.1%)	1 (0.45%)	1 (0.45%)	

sions by the supporters of Taiwan and Peking because both Chinas feared that a "two-China" solution might eventually emerge from the new move.

In the midst of the Vietnam conflict and the Cultural Revolution on mainland China, many member states were reluctant to upset the status quo, but they were keenly aware that a way out of the impasse was in the making in the light of the changing political climate in the United Nations and in the United States.<sup>11</sup> The decreased support for the Italian resolution from 28.1 per cent in 1966 to 23.8 per cent in 1968 and the increased opposition to the resolution from 51.2 per cent in 1966 to 53.2 per cent in 1968 tended to suggest that the "two-China" solution would hardly end the impasse. The question of Chinese representation in the United Nations apparently cannot be solved without a prior resolution of the status of Taiwan. Therefore, the question of the representation of China should be accurately described as "the question of the representation of China and of Taiwan in the United Nations." Current political reality in the Taiwan area tends to confirm the opinion that the two questions are not necessarily incompatible.

### TAIWAN'S LEGAL STATUS

A complicating factor, neglected in discussions on the Chinese representation issue, is the undecided legal status of Taiwan. When Japan surrendered in 1945, the Nationalist Chinese army was authorized to accept the Japanese surrender in Taiwan. The island was not made Chinese territory by virtue of this fact. The status of the Nationalist Chinese army in Taiwan should not differ from that of the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan. Although both Chinas con-

sistently claim Taiwan as an integral part of China on the basis of the Cairo Declaration, the United States has refused to concur in their claims. On the contrary, in a series of official statements, it has consistently held the view that the ultimate legal status of the island remains undetermined.

As early as June, 1950, in ordering the Seventh Fleet to safeguard the Taiwan Straits, President Truman declared that "the determination of the future status of Formosa [Taiwan] must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."<sup>12</sup> Commenting on the San Francisco peace treaty, in which Japan renounced her sovereignty over Taiwan without specifying her successor, Dulles stated in September, 1951, that "the treaty merely took Japan out of the Formosa picture, leaving the position [of Formosa] otherwise unchanged."<sup>13</sup> At a press conference on December 1, 1954, he said:

... technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese peace treaty merely involves a renunciation of Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, in giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China, the United States Senate declared in February, 1955, that

it is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies.<sup>15</sup>

The British government has also consistently held that the de jure sovereignty over the island has not been determined. On February 4, 1955, Anthony Eden, the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, opposed the return of Taiwan to China on the basis of the Cairo Declaration. He stated the British position regarding Taiwan in the House of Commons as follows:

In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Com-

<sup>11</sup> Both major political parties in the United States and their candidates, in the November, 1968, election, emphasized the need for ending the isolation of mainland China.

<sup>12</sup> *State Department Bulletin*, Vol. XXIII, 1950, p. 5.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, September 19, 1951, p. 462.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXI, 1954, p. 899.

<sup>15</sup> *Congressional Record*, Vol. CI, February 9, 1955, p. 138.

mander of the Allied powers; but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese. Under the peace treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the *de jure* sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined.<sup>16</sup>

In recent years, in voting in favor of seating Peking in the United Nations, the British delegation has made it clear that the affirmative vote should not prejudice the British position on the *de jure* status of Taiwan.

Likewise, on April 23, 1964, the French Premier, Georges Pompidou, made clear France's position that her recognition of Communist China (on January 27, 1964) in no way implied her acquiescence to Peking's claim over Taiwan. In Pompidou's view, "Formosa was detached from Japan, but it was not attached to anyone" under the Japanese peace treaty. Therefore, the status of the island "must be decided one of these days, taking the wishes of the Formosa population into consideration."<sup>17</sup>

States that have recognized the government in Peking as the official Chinese government often acknowledge the Chiang Kai-shek regime as the *de facto* government of Taiwan. Among the United Nations members maintaining diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek regime, about 70 per cent cast their votes contrary to the wishes of the Nationalist Chinese on the Italian resolution. Of the total members in the United Nations, only 10.7 per cent in 1966, 12.3 per cent in 1967, and 15.3 per cent in 1968 agreed with the Chiang regime on the resolution to seat Peking and the Italian Resolution. More than 85 per cent of the United Nations mem-

bers, including the United States, declined to sustain a fiction that the regime in Taiwan was the government of mainland China as well. However, they firmly opposed Peking's claim to Taiwan. In due course, they opposed the admission of Communist China to the United Nations prior to an equitable solution for Taiwan.

Politically, the "two-China" solution, admitting both Chinas in the United Nations as representatives of distinctive states, overlooks the wishes of the people of Taiwan. Although the Taiwanese are predominantly of Chinese origin, this does not make them "Chinese." Some 400 years ago, their ancestors moved across the Strait of Taiwan, seeking relief from the piratical devastation that had befallen their homeland in South China. The situation bears close resemblance to the crossing of the Atlantic by the Pilgrims escaping religious persecution.

The Taiwanese have been reared in an environment entirely different from that of mainland China. A long period of complete separation from the mainland has given the Taiwanese a sense of being a distinct nationality group, sharing a common historical and geographical environment, a way of life, a set of values and mores and a common attachment to their homeland. The presumption of both the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists that the Taiwanese are Chinese is untrue. Far from accepting this presumption, the Taiwanese are anxious for independence—a fact of which the international community seems hardly aware.

What alternative policy is there for Taiwan? The policy should be based on the principle of self-determination, rather than the preservation of the Chiang regime in Taiwan. The basic Taiwanese problem is that the Taiwanese are not permitted to participate in their own affairs. The Taiwanese should be able to participate and select their own leaders and should have the right to determine their own destiny. So far the United States has said only that the regime may not invade the mainland, but it has never endorsed the principle of self-determination as a solution to the problem. As

<sup>16</sup> Great Britain, Parliamentary Debate (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, Vol. 536, col. 159 (written answers), February 4, 1955.

<sup>17</sup> *New York Times*, April 24, 1964.

long as the United States stands for self-determination and independence in Vietnam, it is hard to rationalize its self-contradictory policy in Taiwan. The Chiang regime is a minority government, a one-party dictatorship that has alienated most Taiwanese, tramples on political freedoms, stifles intellectual expression and maintains itself in power through the exercise of overwhelming police force and a subdued terror.<sup>18</sup>

United States support of self-determination for Taiwan would give significant momentum to the aspiration of the Taiwanese to create an independent state in their homeland. It would deprive the Chinese Communists of any pretext to "liberate" the island. It would enhance United States prestige and indicate that the United States is committed to supporting free peoples who are resisting a dictatorial rule.

The Chinese, both Nationalists and Communists, will object to self-determination as a solution to the Taiwan problem. The Nationalists may repeat their familiar tactic of countering such a move by exerting pressure on the United States through real or rumored negotiations between Taipei and Peking on a political settlement. The Communists will denounce such a move as further evidence of United States intentions to dominate Taiwan.

Nonetheless, a step can be taken by the United States on its own initiative to further diplomatic efforts to persuade the Nationalists to accommodate the implementation of the self-determination principle through an adoption of a new democratic constitution representing the will of all the people in Taiwan. If this effort fails, the United States should seek United Nations intervention through a trusteeship over the island, pending a final solution by a plebiscite. As long as the legal status of Taiwan is unsettled, the United Nations has a legitimate power to deal with the status of Taiwan under Article 77, Section b, of the Charter, which reads: "the trusteeship system shall apply to territories which may be detached from

enemy status as a result of the Second World War."

Since self-determination is the principle through which most of the Afro-Asian countries have obtained national independence, it is conceivable that a proposal to the U.N. General Assembly to determine Taiwan's ultimate status by plebiscite might command overwhelming support among those nations. This would be an honorable way for the United States to break the Taiwan impasse. If the United Nations trusteeship should fail to materialize, the United States, together with the parties to the Japanese peace treaty, can organize a special committee for the purpose of enforcing a trusteeship, to be followed by a plebiscite.

In population and industry, Taiwan is comparable to the majority of the independent nations of the world; in size (14,000 square miles), the island is larger than Israel, Belgium and the Netherlands, and is nearly equal to Denmark and Switzerland. In cultural advancement (90 per cent literacy) and in social organization, the Taiwanese are qualified to manage their own affairs. The 13 million inhabitants of the island may create a dynamic and constructive society out of the present confusion and bitterness. Taiwan could become an outpost of democracy in the Far East. As for the two million Nationalist Chinese, measures should be taken to secure for them appropriate rehabilitation. No restrictions should be imposed on those who wish to join their families on the mainland. For those who wish to stay on the island permanently, the right of residence should be granted pending their acquisition of citizenship. After the birth of independent Taiwan, she should be admitted to the United Nations.

Peking will continue to regard United  
(Continued on page 177)

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**Peter P. Cheng**, a native of Taiwan, was an assistant professor at the University of Nebraska from 1966 to 1968, and at the University of South Dakota in 1968-1969. He is writing a book on the Far Eastern diplomacy of the Dulles era.

<sup>18</sup> Mark Mancall, ed., *Formosa Today* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 2.



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## BOOK REVIEWS

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CONTEMPORARY CHINA. EDITED BY JOHN F. MELBY. (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. 138 pages, \$4.00.)

CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS IN ACTION. EDITED BY A. DOAK BARNETT. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969. 621 pages, appendix and index, \$12.50.)

In the scholarly field, essays and case studies represent fruitful approaches to the study of the current scene in China. Many authors can make a contribution within the context of a single volume and conclusions invariably tend to be carefully phrased and hedged. Much the best writing of this genre can be found in two recently published volumes that are addressed to the informed layman. The first, *Contemporary China*, deals with a range of problems of immediate relevance to China's domestic and external political development. As such, this treatment is a valuable footnote to the "in depth" studies of the many aspects of Chinese politics and policies. John F. Melby, chairman of the department of political studies at the University of Guelph, Ontario, notes in a brief introduction that "... so few of those who interpret events really know much about China—how the Chinese think, what they value, how the world looks to them." The book is an effort, largely successful, to fill some of the gaps by presenting the reader with some specific information about mainland China. Two of the papers are of more than casual interest, for they stimulate the reader to read outside the volume to find supporting data for the writers' arguments. C. H. G. Oldham's article on "Science and Technology in China's Future" elaborates on the national goals which China's leaders sense they must meet if their country is to be converted from a

tradition-bound society to a modernizing one. His estimates of China's future are provocative, especially his evaluation of China's overall social development and haphazard, or staggered, progress toward industrialization. A brief, yet detailed, note by E. Stuart Kirby on "Trade and Development of Mainland China" is a complementary treatment of statistical patterns that show the division of China's trade with the world. China's trade relations seem to belie the widely held assumption that the country is, or was, in a state of political and economic isolation from the world during the period of the 1950's and the 1960's.

The second volume, *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, is also composed of selected papers, with a somewhat different and better organized emphasis. The basic theme is domestic, especially in matters of tension and agreement which are expressed and resolved at high leadership levels. Twelve authors present a wide range of topics, nearly all related to personality and behavioral characteristics of leadership at the local and national levels. Generalizations pertaining to specific problems are carefully couched in short-range terms, and hypotheses are formulated with reference to specific Chinese institutions or selected processes. The result of these endeavors is an excellent and careful assessment of Chinese micropolitics, with insight into situations which, in the Chinese context, are still being developed. For example, Ying-Mao Kau's piece on "The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949-1965" concludes with the admonition that "the Wuhan bureaucracy indicates that there have been few signs of the emergence of a new generation of technocrats able to

(Continued on page 181)

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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# New Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party

*On April 14, 1969, the Ninth Communist Party Congress, meeting in Peking, adopted a new constitution. Excerpts follow:*

### General Program

The Communist party of China is the political party of the proletariat.

The basic program of the Communist party of China is to overthrow the bourgeoisie completely, to replace the bourgeois dictatorship with the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to defeat capitalism with socialism. The ultimate objective of the party is the realization of communism.

The Communist party of China is composed of advanced elements of the proletariat. It is a vigorous vanguard organization leading the proletariat and the revolutionary masses in fighting against class enemies.

The Communist party of China takes Marxism, Leninism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung as the theoretical basis guiding its thought. The thought of Mao Tse-tung is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading toward total collapse while socialism is heading toward worldwide victory.

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Comrade Lin Piao has consistently held high the great red banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung and most loyally and resolutely carried out and defended Comrade Mao Tse-tung's proletarian revolutionary line. Comrade Lin Piao is Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms and successor.

Socialist society is a historical phase of considerable duration. In this historical phase, classes, class contradictions and class struggle will exist throughout, as will the struggle between the two roads of socialism and capitalism, the danger of capitalist restoration, and the threat of subversion and aggression by imperialism and modern revisionism. These contradictions can be resolved only by relying on the Marxist theory and practice of uninterrupted revolution. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in our country is just such a great political revolution under conditions of socialism, in which the proletariat opposes the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes.

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The Communist party of China firmly upholds proletarian internationalism, resolutely unites with all true Marxist-Leninist political parties and organizations in the whole world and with all oppressed peoples and nations of the whole world, supporting one another and learning from one another, and fights to overthrow imperialism headed by the United States, modern revisionism headed by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, and reactionaries of all countries, in order to build a new world free from imperialism, capitalism, and systems of exploitation.

The Communist party of China is consolidated and developed in the midst of big windstorms and heavy seas and in the struggle against right and "left" opportunist lines. In the course of class struggle and the struggle of the lines, the party must continuously get rid of the waste and let in the fresh, and insure that party and state leadership will forever remain in the hands of Marxists.

The Communist party of China with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its leader is a great, glorious, correct party and leadership nucleus of the Chinese people.

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### Membership

#### Article 1

All Chinese workers, poor peasants, lower-middle peasants, revolutionary servicemen and other revolutionary elements who have reached the age of 18, who accept the Constitution of the party, join a party organization and work within it, and who carry out the resolutions of the party and pay membership dues, may become members of the Communist party of China.

#### Article 2

Any person applying for admission into the party must individually carry out the procedure of joining the party. An applicant must be recommended by two party members and must fill out application

*(Continued on page 180)*

## TAIWAN AND THE "TWO CHINAS"

(Continued from page 174)

States support of Taiwan's independence as the major stumbling-block to a detente with Washington. However, as former United States Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, wrote: "In time Peking will accommodate itself to the reality of an independent Taiwan, even if it does not accept it in theory."<sup>19</sup> When the stumbling-block to reconciliation is removed, the implementation of a policy of "containment without necessarily isolation" toward Peking can be advanced.

<sup>19</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 176.

## CHINA'S ECONOMY: BALANCE SHEET AFTER 20 YEARS

(Continued from page 141)

cyclical character, referred to by the Chinese themselves as the "U-shaped development." Chinese business cycles seem to be politically induced and exert their influence on the economy through changes in investment outlays.<sup>13</sup> Periods of boom have been succeeded by longer or shorter periods of recession (e.g., in 1957, 1959-1962, 1967). The picture of an economy surging forward and up-

<sup>13</sup> The problem of politically-induced Communist business cycles has been broached in my "The Economic Cost," *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1968, pp. 3-4. It is more fully developed in my forthcoming *The Political Economy of Communist China* (Scranton, Pennsylvania: International Textbook Company) scheduled for publication in 1970.

<sup>14</sup> *Quarterly Economic Review*, loc. cit., p. 7. The largest jump apparently took place in the production of red plastic covers for the Chairman's Quotations. "At present," said the Kwangtung Province Revolutionary Committee in October, 1968, "we should grasp the making of thin relief matrix for printing Chairman Mao's works as the most important item of all work." *Kwangtung Radio*, October 7, 1968, in *Union Research Service*, Vol. 53, No. 18, November 29, 1968, p. 228. The *Peking Review* of January 3, 1968, stated that "the workers and staff charged with the glorious task of producing paper for printing Chairman Mao's works and portraits have surpassed their target. The output of red plastic covers for Chairman Mao's works and of Chairman Mao's badges has greatly exceeded the plan."

ward in an uninterrupted élan is not only incorrect, but is not even shared by the Chinese leaders.

The Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969 affected the performance of industry less than might have been expected. There were serious disruptions in production and transportation in 1967 and there probably was a breakdown in the distribution of a number of key raw materials and products. For a time, the industrial economy suffered from a relaxation of labor discipline including widespread absenteeism, slackness on the job, confused management and strikes. It is believed that very little industrial capital construction was undertaken from 1966 through 1968; cement output in 1967 declined by about 20 per cent from the 1966 level; and fertilizer production fell by perhaps as much as 50 per cent.<sup>14</sup>

The more serious, long-range effect of the Cultural Revolution, however, may well be the officially proclaimed disdain for material rewards to workers and management and the suspicion of the expert, be he manager, engineer or technician. The Maoist philosophy on the conduct of industry has been enshrined in the so-called "Anshan Constitution" promulgated in mid-1968. The constitution proclaims politics to be in command of all economic work, instructs workers to participate in management and managers to do physical labor on a rotating basis, extolls workers' technical innovations, and calls for the abolition of "reactionary rules and regulations" which range from the accepted incentive systems of payment to labor discipline. Under the slogan, "Better Troops, Simpler Administration," overstuffed industrial and government administrations are being pruned. A vast movement to send young urban people to the countryside is on foot. Some of the youngsters are apparently unemployed or underemployed, but the intent seems to be equally to settle the country's border areas with ethnic Chinese and reverse the massive flow of people from the countryside to the cities which took place during the Cultural Revolution.

One may hazard the prediction that the

Maoist conception of industrial management will not prevail, simply because it fails to deliver the goods. Psychological incentives and the inspirational impetus to effort which comes from reading the Chairman's quotations are in themselves not enough to assure the smooth flow of materials and finished products or to run a modern industrial establishment in all its almost infinite complexity. Even Mao's models, the oil workers at Taching (whose proletarian consciousness had been offered as an example for all to follow) had left their jobs in 1967, and allowed the oil to gush at will, while they traveled to Peking to present their material grievances and bargain for a more sensible way of conducting the ordinary business of life.

### AGRICULTURE

In the field of agriculture, the Chinese are in trouble, and serious trouble at that. There is a point beyond which changes in the institutional structure of agriculture will not raise output and productivity, and that point was reached long ago in China. The most outstanding single fact about China's Communist economy is its failure to raise the output of food grains above what appears to be the traditional plateau of about 180-200 million tons per year. In 1950, output was 125 million tons; in 1957, it was 185 million tons; in 1967, it was estimated at 187 million tons; and, in 1968, at about 180 million tons. For 12 years now, the Chinese have not managed to increase the production of food grains, and they are not likely to do this unless they apply massive doses of modern science and technology to the land. Hard work, native inventiveness, even the seminal thought of the Chairman, are no longer enough. In China, dynasties have been toppled precisely because of their failure to climb out of the traditional food-grains trap. The Chinese Communists are in the trap, hanging on for their lives by the Canadian wheat rope.

It is obvious that China is still in turmoil; the factional rivalry at the top has not been settled; new ways of running the country's vast enterprise have not been developed; the fundamental problems besetting the economy

have been broached but not solved. The issues are of such magnitude that they defy cold reasoning. One day Mao will die, and his disappearance will almost certainly be followed by important changes in the country's domestic life and foreign policy. All this, however, lies in the realm of conjecture. The most one can say now is that the Communist regime has managed to survive and function in circumstances that would have wiped out most other systems of government.

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## THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

(Continued from page 134)

respect of all factions in Communist China, from the C.C.P. senior statesmen to the young Red Guards. The belief that the Ninth Congress has demoted Chou seems to be influenced by a conviction that the C.C.P. will never be able to pull itself together again.

The possibility of a Mao-Lin split is actually small. Unlike Liu Shao-ch'i, who has a few theories of his own about the Chinese Communist movement and its future, and who can out-talk and out-write Mao, Lin Piao poses no threat either to Mao's figurehead leadership or to the overall current policy line of the C.C.P. Lin's real strength is questionable. He commands personal loyalty within his own unit, the Fourth Field Army, which he has led for years, but there are three other field armies which do not owe him much allegiance. The Ninth Congress has formalized the central leadership realignment started in 1965. Away from Peking, however, reform in local C.C.P. branches is far from complete. The job is expected to be carried out by the local revolutionary committees, mostly non-C.C.P. activists, that emerged at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. In some areas, new "nucleus groups of the C.C.P." have appeared, signaling some progress in the rejuvenation of the party units in the field.<sup>24</sup> The future of the revolutionary committees has not been defined, and it is difficult to

<sup>24</sup> Li Tien-min, *op. cit.*



predict whether they are expected to be absorbed into the C.C.P. or simply to be disbanded when their midwifery purpose has been served. Also vague is the future of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps, which has functioned well in the past as a training ground for C.C.P. members. Some reform may take place in the corps as well.<sup>25</sup>

There has been little mention of the middle echelon between Peking and the county-level C.C.P. units. The gap may have been left open purposely to allow the C.C.P. to adapt its new organizational structure and the lines of control to the overall situation, which is still fluid.

The Cultural Revolution and the Ninth C.C.P. Congress have revealed several factors that may exercise a binding influence on the future of Communist China's leadership. The pattern of periodical reforms has been maintained, and is likely to be repeated. What is meant by perpetual revolution or continuous struggle under the proletarian dictatorship (however contradictory to the orthodox Marxist logic this may be) is only an admission that men like Mao Tse-tung feel insecure about their socialist experiment in China, and may go to any length to avoid a repetition of the Nationalist experience of the 1920's or a compromise with the United States. Mao Tse-tung's mass line is an affirmation of his policy of the worker-peasant-soldier line of the 1940's, which had a still earlier origin in the Communist distrust of anything likely to restore bourgeois values. The Ninth Congress has done much to upgrade the importance of local elements and leaders, who occupy three-fifths of the seats in the new Central Committee, and nearly 40 per cent of the Politburo. The Congress will contribute to a growing feeling that a larger cross section of the people is sharing in the control of the party and the government. This fulfills one aspect of the mass line political promise, although one

cannot forget that in Chinese history many clever rulers have used this device to prevent the development of enclaves of autonomy and resistance.

Perhaps clearer than all other revelations of the Cultural Revolution and the Ninth Congress are the high degree of fluidity of C.C.P. politics and the limited extent of unified national control from border to border. No prestructured time-table could be discerned during the development of the Cultural Revolution, and the rather irregular disorders from place to place indicate that the tried-and-true C.C.P. guerrilla warfare approach seems to have been applied. Once an overall objective has been selected, one does not hesitate to fall back two steps after each three forward steps, depending upon the situation.

The size of the country and its enormous population have made it difficult for any political machinery to operate with push-button efficiency, in spite of the C.C.P.'s secret service and its expertise in organizing and manipulating the masses. Mao Tse-tung and his successor will always wonder how strong the unified national control is. Stability, as it is understood conventionally, will probably not be found in Red China for a long time to come. But it would be an error to assume that the C.C.P.'s fluid politics spells any imminent collapse of the Peking regime, and such tactics of harassment as the Republic of China on Taiwan attempted on July 2, 1969, with a "major" naval attack on the Fukien coast, have a doubtful effect on the destiny of mainland China.

As to the meaning of all the political commotion, one of course must not underestimate the element of internal power struggle. One might at the same time oversimplify the problem by ascribing it exclusively to Mao's lunatic addiction to personal glory.<sup>26</sup> The concern over the possible loss of the "fruit of revolution" is very real and widespread in Red China, and Mao is not the only one who is willing to see his name used, in whatever way may be helpful, to prevent this loss.

<sup>25</sup> *The People's Daily* (Peking, July 1, 1969), editorial.

<sup>26</sup> Wang Chien-min, "The Mao Tse-tung Thought is That of a Monarch, Destined to be Eliminated," *Issues and Studies*, VIII (June 10, 1969), 9, p. 589 (in Chinese).

## CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

*(Continued from page 167)*

South Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand are concerned for their safety and that of Malaysia and Singapore. On June 21, 1969, at a five-nation conference (Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom) held in Canberra, Australia, to discuss the joint defense of Malaysia and Singapore, Australian Prime Minister John G. Gorton said that "we feel that the real threat to peace is in Asia. Even in Washington, our diplomatic effort is concerned mainly with Asia." He also indicated that if the five nations found their military resources insufficient, they would look to "others" for help.

Along the same line, another cooperative effort was made in 1966 by nine Asian and Pacific nations, known as the Asian-Pacific Council (ASPAC). The nations in this group are Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Nationalist China, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand. A meeting was called in Japan in June, 1969, to exchange information and discuss economic, social and technical planning. Because the present Japanese constitution does not permit Japan to have an army, navy or air force, and because Malaysia fears to offend Communist China openly, these two nations were reluctant to be involved in an anti-Communist China project. The Philippines were also unwilling to antagonize Communist China. South Korea, Nationalist China, South Vietnam and Thailand were eager to introduce a concrete plan against Communist China, but they were unable to advance their proposals. Thus, the decisions of ASPAC were primarily concerned with financial, social and technical planning and cooperation.

President Nixon's visit to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India and Pakistan, and Secretary of State William P. Rogers' visit to Nationalist China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand in July and early August, 1969, were strong indications

that the United States is still very much concerned about the Communist Chinese threat in East Asia and the Pacific. This huge land region with its enormous population of almost two billion and its abundant strategic and raw materials is one of the world's potential tinder boxes.

## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

*(Continued from page 176)*

forms. After the party branch examines and extensively hears the views of the masses both inside and outside the party, the application must be passed by a general meeting of the party branch and then approved by the next higher party committee.

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### Organizational Structure of the Party

#### Article 5

The organizational principle of the party is democratic centralism.

Leading organs of the party at all levels shall be produced through democratic consultation and election.

The whole party shall observe unified discipline: individuals shall obey the organization; the minority shall obey the majority; the lower levels shall obey the higher levels; and the whole party shall obey the center.

Leading organs of the party at all levels shall make work reports at specified intervals to party congresses or general meetings of members, regularly hear the views of the masses both inside and outside the party, and accept their supervision. A party member has the right to criticize and make suggestions to a party organization and leading persons at all levels.

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#### Article 6

The highest leading organ of the party is the National Congress and the Central Committee it produces. Local, military and department-leading organs of the party are the party congresses or general meetings of members of the corresponding levels and the party committees they produce.

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### Central Organization of Party

#### Article 8

Under normal circumstances, the National Congress of the party shall be held once every five years.

Under special circumstances, it may be held ahead of schedule or postponed.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 175)

give a fresh outlook to those operating the system." Another article, entitled "Sources and Methodological Problems in the Study of Contemporary China," recounts in detail the nature of contemporary Chinese research materials available to the public at large. Not the least of the vast array of available data can be derived from biographical studies, Chinese wall posters and newspapers, chronologies and other rich yet secondary sources of information. This is an unusual book of great value to students of Chinese life.

René Peritz  
Indiana State University

**CHIANG KAI-SHEK.** By ROBERT PAYNE.  
(New York: Weybright and Talley, 1969.  
138 pages, chronology, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

**MAO TSE-TUNG.** By ROBERT PAYNE.  
(New York: Weybright and Talley, 1969.  
343 pages, chronological table, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

Two wide-ranging popular accounts of Chinese leaders are available in the Payne books. Much of the information that is discussed in the biographies of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung is easily available elsewhere, but the narrative is well handled and the reader's interest in the subject matter is unlikely to flag. The reader is given a detailed summary of the famous Sian incident which marked the turning point in modern Nationalist China's history, and he is not spared a general discussion of Chiang's fall from grace on the Chinese mainland. One of the more intriguing chapters in *Chiang Kai-shek* notes at some length the Generalissimo's xenophobia and disdain for the West which supported him during the greater part of his public career.

The companion biography on Mao Tse-tung similarly paints his life story in very broad brush strokes. The author, having had some dealings with Mao, includes in his exposition comments which often set the tone for a specific chapter. Thus he notes, *inter alia*, that "Mao began speaking in a surprisingly low voice, smiling at Chu Teh whose harsher voice growled in reply." For those who like readable books, based on personal and general information culminating in instant history, these books are to be recommended.

R.P.

**ASIAN FRONTIERS: STUDIES IN A CONTINUING PROBLEM.** By ALASTAIR LAMB. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 229 pages, index and bibliography, \$5.00.)

Many of the independent countries of Asia have come into existence as a result of policy decisions by former colonial governments. In the process of decolonization, the old imperial boundaries have usually been accepted by the independent Asian states. Alastair Lamb, currently at the University of Leeds, has critically appraised a series of the regional boundary problems that resulted and has traced the historical reasons for the delineation of particular Asian frontiers.

One of his most interesting chapters, on "Russia, China, and Mongolia," surveys the background of the very lengthy Sino-Russian border and its impact on current Sino-Chinese relationships. The Chinese have often made much of the fact that the Russian boundary, in its present form, is the product of forced treaties. It is in the area of Sinkiang and Manchuria that a major dispute between the two countries may well be simmering. The author has much to say on this subject; his views are buttressed with many relevant maps.

R.P.

## CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES

(Continued from page 149)

Taiwan and the freeing of China from the imposing problems posed for her by tacit United States-Soviet cooperation (the "holy alliance").

### THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

How effective are China's military capabilities in the face of these problems? As we have seen, China has the capability to defend her frontiers against small-scale attacks, and presumably she calculates that a major war against her is too hazardous an operation for either the Americans or the Russians.

The Chinese may very well be aiming at the neutralization of their weak neighbors as a long-term solution. This will depend on international political factors as well as on the internal political situations in the countries in question. China has some leverage on both sets of factors. In this connection, China's ability to support indigenous insurgency forces is well known. The effectiveness of such operations, however, depends ultimately upon the indigenous situation in the countries concerned and cannot be controlled or manipulated at will by the Chinese.

China's present military capability has no immediate bearing on the Taiwan issue. Nor does it solve the problems that arise out of the United States-U.S.S.R. "holy alliance."

### THE LONG RUN

In the long run, the acquisition of a credible second-strike nuclear capability seems necessary if China is to solve her major defense problems. But China will first have to survive the decade of the 1970's despite her increased attractiveness (and hence vulnerability) to a preemptive strike because of her deployment of a first-strike capability and despite an inevitable change of leadership. Should this produce a major crisis in China, the strategic and political consequences for

East Asia would be incalculable. At one extreme, China might decline as a major power in the area; at the other extreme, a militarist government in Peking might patch up China's quarrels with the Soviet Union. It is, however, possible that Lin Piao will succeed Mao without a major crisis.

Whatever the outcome of the coming change of leadership, analysis suggests that China's military posture in her third decade as a Communist power will continue to be defensive and that her military capability will continue to be inadequate for the attainment of her minimal foreign policy goals. But if the coming change of leadership is relatively untroubled, at the end of the decade the Chinese will be in a position to claim strategic invulnerability.

## TWENTY YEARS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

(Continued from page 155)

tionary warfare once propagated by Moscow. But the strategy for conquest in the Afro-Asian world conceived by Lenin and supported by Stalin was not meant to serve as the strategy for Communist rule after conquest. Thus Maoism is unacceptable both in theory and practice within the structure of Marxism-Leninism as known in the Soviet-dominated world.

A revival of the Marxian concept of the "Asiatic mode of production" as the cause of Mao's "petit bourgeois fanaticism" was advanced by the Soviets. The new Chinese Communist party constitution<sup>1</sup> accepted at the Ninth Party Congress in Peking in April, 1959 (which replaced the Marxist-Leninist party with the cult of Mao and proclaimed Lin Piao as Mao's heir and successor) was, in Soviet eyes, no longer representative of communism. Rather it indicated a new "monarchical" order which no Communist could tolerate.

<sup>1</sup> For excerpts from this text see pp. 176 ff. of this issue.



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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of July, 1969, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Disarmament

(See also *United Kingdom*)

July 29—After long negotiation, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agree to admit 6 more countries to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, raising the membership to 26. The original membership was 18, but France has never attended the meetings. Japan and Mongolia joined in May, 1969.

### Middle East Crisis

(See also *Intl, United Nations; U.S.S.R.*)

July 2—Israeli defense officials announce the shooting down of 4 MIG-21 planes of the U.A.R. air force.

July 4—Israel Galili, Israeli Information Minister, declares that the Gaza Strip will remain a part of Israel.

July 5—Arab saboteurs destroy 2 towers carrying electric power lines to Israeli settlements in the Negev.

July 8—Israeli planes shoot down 7 Syrian MIG-21 fighter-bombers near the Syrian-Israeli border.

U.A.R. troops cross the Suez Canal and attack Israeli troops.

July 10—Another crossing of the Suez Canal by U.A.R. troops is reported by Cairo. Some 40 Israeli troops are reported killed or wounded.

July 20—A 4-hour battle rages along the Suez Canal. Israeli jets attack U.A.R. ground installations for the first time since the 1967 war.

July 24—The heaviest fighting since the end of the 1967 war rages along the Suez Canal. Jet planes and artillery fire are involved.

July 27—Jet aircraft belonging to the U.A.R. attack Israeli positions across the Suez Canal.

July 31—In her first offensive maneuver

against Israel since the June, 1967, war, Syria sends jets and uses heavy artillery to attack the main Israeli post on Mount Herman and on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

### Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

July 1—Guatemalan Foreign Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr reports progress in the efforts of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua to mediate a dispute between El Salvador and Honduras touched off by riots late in June following a football championship playoff.

July 4—An emergency meeting of the Permanent Council of the O.A.S. is held in Washington to discuss charges of aggression by Honduras and El Salvador.

July 17—Fighting flares again along the El Salvador-Honduras border after peace missions to the two Central American countries have obtained cease-fire agreements.

July 18—El Salvador accepts a peace plan drafted by the O.A.S. to end her undeclared war with Honduras.

July 19—In complaints to the O.A.S., both El Salvador and Honduras charge cease-fire violations.

July 22—El Salvador asks the O.A.S. to set up a war-crimes court to try Honduran officials for genocide as one of five conditions for withdrawing her troops from areas they occupied in Honduras during the six-day border war.

July 23—An emergency meeting is called by the foreign ministers of the O.A.S. to deal with the refusal of El Salvador to withdraw her troops from Honduras.

July 27—The foreign ministers of Colombia, Peru and Paraguay are appointed mediators to negotiate with El Salvador on procedures for the withdrawal of troops and

on guarantees of protection for Salvadorans living in Honduras.

July 29—El Salvador informs the O.A.S. that she will pull her troops out of Honduras.

## Space Exploration

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

July 16—Three U.S. astronauts in the Apollo 11 are launched toward the moon; around the world millions of viewers watch the event on television.

July 20—Astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., land on the moon; the first human footsteps on the moon are televised for millions of viewers.

British astronomers report that the Soviet spacecraft, Luna 15, has made a hard landing on the moon.

July 24—The Apollo 11 returns to earth and lands in the Pacific; the astronauts, in quarantine to avoid possible earth contamination from the moon, are greeted by U.S. President Richard Nixon through a glass window.

July 29—The U.S. spacecraft Mariner 6 begins to take and relay to earth 50 pictures of Mars starting at a distance of 770,000 miles; this is a closer range than ever before attempted. Mariner 7 is scheduled to make a similar approach to Mars August 5.

July 30—Mariner 6 relays pictures of Mars at a range of 2,000 miles from Mars.

## United Nations

(See also *Intl. Middle East Crisis*)

July 2—Acting on the recommendations of an international commission studying the use of chemical and biological warfare, Secretary General U Thant calls on all governments to halt the development and production of such weapons and to destroy their present stockpiles.

July 7—The resumption of open warfare along the Suez Canal is announced by Secretary General Thant.

July 27—A Swedish member of the U.N. truce observation team is killed at Port Taufiq, in Egypt, by an Israeli shell.

## War in Vietnam

July 1—South Vietnamese soldiers open the road to Benhet, which has been under siege for two months. North Vietnamese troops have been pulled back from the area.

July 2—U.S. military officials report that North Vietnam has pulled 3 regiments back across the border of the demilitarized zone into North Vietnam.

July 4—A reduction of enemy-initiated fighting continues for the 13th day.

July 7—The first U.S. troops to be withdrawn from Vietnam under U.S. President Richard Nixon's orders leave Vietnam. 814 soldiers are flown to Tacoma, Washington.

July 11—In a nationally televised speech, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu urges the Vietcong to participate in free elections to be supervised by a joint electoral commission supervised by an international body.

The "provisional revolutionary government" established last month by the Vietcong derides President Thieu's election proposal as trickery.

July 13—The North Vietnamese newspaper *Nhan Dan* calls the Thieu proposal "stupid."

July 15—In a speech in Vietnam, South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky says South Vietnam should walk out of the Paris peace talks if the Vietcong continues to refuse to support the elections proposed by President Thieu.

July 20—The lull in general combat continues into the fifth week.

North Vietnam's President Ho Chi Minh says that no free elections can be held in South Vietnam as long as U.S. troops are in the country.

## ARGENTINA

July 11—Members of the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property stage a street demonstration calling for a purge of leftist subversives in the Roman Catholic Church. The demonstration has the tacit approval of the government because all public demonstrations are banned

under Argentina's current state of siege.

July 31—In the city of Cordoba, armed rebels seize a radio station and broadcast a demand for the resignation of President Juan Carlos Onganía.

## **BRAZIL**

July 1—The National Security Council announces that 75 persons, including government and military officials, have been deprived of their political rights for 10 years.

July 11—Brazil's two political parties complete the first step in reorganizing their party structure. Leaders of the National Renovating Alliance (which supports the government of President Artur da Costa e Silva) and of the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement say they are confident they have met government requirements for a nation-wide party structure. The parties are replacing the three major and 10 minor parties abolished by presidential decree.

July 13—Premier Marcello Caetano of Portugal completes a 5-day state visit to Brazil. A joint communiqué indicates that the two countries have agreed to increase commercial and cultural interchanges.

July 26—Security officials arrest 29 persons accused of bank holdups and embezzlements to secure money to support anti-government activities.

## **CAMBODIA**

July 31—Prince Norodom Sihanouk resigns as chief of state, transferring his duties to a special council; he remains president of the Sanghum party.

## **CANADA**

July 7—A bill sponsored by the federal government to make French equal with English as an official language in all federal offices passes the House of Commons by an overwhelming voice vote.

## **CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)**

July 5—Reports from Hong Kong indicate that official spokesmen for the Communist

government are warning the people of the imminence of World War III.

July 9—Defense Minister Lin Piao denounces Soviet Russia for the verbal attacks against China in the conference of 75 Communist parties held in Moscow last month.

Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien urges the provisional revolutionary government (Vietcong) of South Vietnam to continue the fight against the United States imperialists.

July 13—The Chinese delegation to the Soviet-Chinese border peace talks has reversed its refusal to continue negotiations. Shipping regulations on the border rivers will be the main topic of discussion.

## **CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (Nationalist)**

July 1—Reports reaching *The New York Times* from Taiwan describe increasing government pressure against students and journalists. It is reported that no more Chinese students will be permitted to go to Japan to study; that returning students have been arrested and imprisoned; and that newspaper editor Kuo Yi-tung has been held in prison incommunicado for the past six months awaiting sentencing for printing a Popeye cartoon that the government interprets as a satire on Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

July 3—The Nationalist government publicizes a raid by "guerrilla" forces on a mainland Chinese naval base.

July 26—The 600,000-man army is to be modernized and streamlined into a mobile strike force, according to Major General R. C. Ciccolella, chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group.

## **CUBA**

July 13—Marc Sone, associate publisher of *Ramparts* (a U.S. periodical), says he has received a note from Eldridge Cleaver and that the black militant leader has left Cuba.

July 14—Premier Fidel Castro, in a speech marking the beginning of the sugar harvest, formally pledges full support for "any true revolution" in Latin America.

July 22—Castro and other Cuban officials visit Soviet ships in Havana harbor.

July 27—A one-week visit by a Soviet naval fleet ends; the ships leave Havana.

### **CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

July 25—The Metal Workers Union issues an open letter to its membership urging avoidance of provocative acts against the government on the anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

### **DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

July 2—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller arrives in Santo Domingo.

July 3—Following Rockefeller's departure, government authorities announce that 3 persons were killed and 3 were wounded in incidents during the Rockefeller visit. (See also *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*, July 6.)

### **EIRE**

July 2—Newly reelected Prime Minister John Lynch names a new cabinet and appoints a Protestant as his Deputy Prime Minister, the highest post ever achieved by a non-Catholic in Eire.

### **FRANCE**

July 4—The Ministry of Economics and Finance announces a 1968 loss of gold and currency reserves amounting to \$3.2 billion.

July 8—After a week of debate among government officials, agreement is reached to build 3 more Concorde supersonic aircraft. Tests of the prototypes at supersonic speeds are scheduled for the French model this fall and for the British model next spring.

July 10—In his first news conference since assuming the presidency, Georges Pompidou says that the embargo on the sale of 50 Mirage fighter-bombers paid for by Israel will be maintained.

### **GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)**

July 1—Gustav Heinemann is sworn in as the new President of the republic. He is the first Social Democrat to win the office.

July 31—The government reveals that the

U.S. is storing poison gas in West Germany. (See also *U.S.*, *Military*.)

### **GREECE**

July 3—A prominent judge and 3 lawyers who resisted the military government's attacks on the Council of State (the country's highest court) are arrested and banished to remote mountain villages.

July 4—The military government publishes a law legitimizing its suspension of the constitutional rights of the Council of State. The Council was established in 1935 to protect citizens from arbitrary acts of the government.

July 9—The last president of the now-abolished Parliament, Demetrius Papaspyrou, issues a strong denunciation of the military government for its purging of a senior judge from the Council of State.

### **GUYANA**

July 2—Police break up a demonstration protesting the visit of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller.

July 4—Rockefeller arrives and is greeted by Prime Minister Forbes Burnham.

July 5—Prime Minister Burnham tells Rockefeller's mission that Guyana's development is hampered by the threat of invasion from Venezuela.

### **HAITI**

July 2—Thousands of people cheer New York Governor Rockefeller on his arrival in Haiti. President François Duvalier, who has been ill, meets with him for 75 minutes.

### **HONDURAS**

(See also *Intl.*, *O.A.S.*)

July 25—The Honduran government announces that it will discuss only the withdrawal of Salvadorean forces from Honduran soil. El Salvador has asked for guarantees of safety for the Salvadoreans living in Honduras.

### **INDIA**

(See also *Pakistan*)

July 4—Federal rule is imposed on the state



of Bihar when the coalition government proves unable to produce a stable majority.

July 12—Overcoming opposition from conservative members of her Congress party leadership, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi obtains approval of a bill promoting economic reforms, including the control of large banks and increased control over imports.

July 13—A spokesman for the Defense Ministry charges that on July 10 Chinese troops fired on an Indian army patrol at a Himalayan border.

Sanjiva Reddy, speaker of the lower house of Parliament, and a foe of Prime Minister Gandhi in the Congress party, is named as the party's candidate for President.

July 16—Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai has been relieved of his portfolio as Minister of Finance by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in her continuing struggle against the conservatives in the Congress party. Desai resigns his deputy premiership in anger.

July 19—The country's 14 largest banks are nationalized by the central government.

July 31—A rioting mob rampages through the West Bengal legislative assembly in Calcutta, after the killing of a policeman.

## ISRAEL

(See *Intl. Middle East Crisis*)

## ITALY

July 5—A split in the Socialist party causes the resignation of four cabinet ministers and the consequent dissolution of the cabinet.

July 13—President Giuseppe Saragat asks Mariano Rumor to form a new government from the same coalition parties that ruled until the cabinet's resignation 8 days ago. Rumor, who was Premier of the old cabinet and who has been heading a caretaker government, agrees to try to form a new government.

## JAMAICA

July 3—New York Governor Rockefeller

arrives in Kingston and meets with Prime Minister Hugh Shearer.

## JAPAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

## KENYA

July 5—An unidentified gunman kills Economics Minister Tom Mboya on a street in Nairobi. The 36-year-old leader had just returned from an economic commission meeting in Ethiopia.

## KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

July 25—The governing party, the Democratic Republicans, begin drafting a constitutional revision which will permit President Chung Hee Park to seek a third term.

Park says he will resign if the proposed amendment is rejected by the voters.

## MALAYSIA

July 5—Rioting between Chinese and Malays, which broke out again yesterday, is reported to have taken 7 lives, raising the death toll to 202 since May 13. The government has asked security forces to act to prevent further outbreaks.

## NIGERIA

July 1—The halt in relief flights to Biafra ordered by the federal government of Nigeria 3 weeks ago is denounced by the newly appointed president of the International Red Cross, Marcel Naville. The government's announcement yesterday that it would take over the relief work is called a deliberate insult to the impartial humanitarian work of the Red Cross.

July 6—The Red Cross and the Nigerian government agree on terms for the resumption of food and medical shipments to Biafra.

July 9—A Biafran spokesman says Biafra will not accept daytime relief flights and inspection of shipments by the Nigerian government. He claims that Nigeria is not interested in relief but in genocide.

## PAKISTAN

- July 4—Settlement of a long-standing border dispute between India and Pakistan over the marshy plains of the Rann of Cutch is announced.
- July 12—A foreign office spokesman says that a plea by India to normalize trade and transport between Pakistan and India has been rejected.
- July 28—Martial law is relaxed by President A. M. Yahya Khan to permit greater political activity in preparation for national elections.

## PANAMA

- July 7—The state-supported University of Panama is reopened. It has been closed by the government since December, 1968, due to student unrest.

## SOUTH AFRICA

- July 10—The Supreme Court finds an editor and 2 reporters guilty of having published stories on brutal conditions in South African prisons.
- July 11—A \$280 fine and suspended sentences are given three newsmen convicted yesterday of violating the Prisons Act.
- July 12—Laurence Gandar, the editor who was fined yesterday by the Supreme Court, publishes an editorial defending the freedom of the press. A rival newspaper calls for an investigation of prison conditions.

## SPAIN

- July 22—Generalissimo Francisco Franco proclaims Prince Juan Carlos of Bourbon as his heir. The prince will be chief of the Spanish state and king on the death or incapacitation of Franco.

## SYRIA

(See *Intl. Middle East Crisis*)

## TURKEY

- July 3—Turkey and the U.S. sign a new joint defense agreement stressing Turkey's absolute sovereignty over U.S. military installations.

## U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl. Space Exploration; China*)

- July 4—Continued aid to Arab countries is pledged by President Nikolai Podgorny.
- July 7—*Tass*, the official news agency, announces that 7 Soviet warships will visit Cuba.
- July 8—Charges of aggression are exchanged by Soviet and Chinese spokesmen following a new clash between troops at the Amur River frontier.
- July 10—A call for friendly relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and a warning against Chinese violence are issued by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.
- July 13—*Tass* reports that the Chinese have broken off border talks with the U.S.S.R.
- The U.S.S.R. launches an unmanned craft to the moon 3 days before the U.S. Apollo 11 mission.

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Intl. Middle East Crisis*)

## UNITED KINGDOM

- July 1—Queen Elizabeth II invests her elder son, Charles, as Prince of Wales, at a traditional ceremony at Caernavon Castle in Wales.
- July 10—The Disarmament Conference meeting in Geneva receives a British draft convention which would ban development, production or use of chemical and biological weapons, and would require destruction of those now in hand.

## British Territories

### Bermuda

- July 11—D. Colin Selly, spokesman for the government in Bermuda, says all is quiet as the first regional black power conference opens its 4-day session. He says there has been no change in the placement of the 106 British marines and a helicopter squadron brought in to bolster Bermuda's police.

## UNITED STATES

### Agriculture

- July 9—The Agriculture Department says

that it has suspended the use of DDT and similar pesticides in its programs pending a 30-day review, because of charges that these pesticides are dangerous to man and his environment.

## Civil Rights

(See also *Politics*)

July 1—The Chicago Housing Authority is ordered by a federal district court judge to integrate public housing projects by dispersing them in white neighborhoods and assigning a large proportion of Negroes to them.

July 3—An administration policy statement declares that Southern school districts will be held to the September, 1969, desegregation deadline except for those with "bona fide educational and administrative problems." This is a modification of the Johnson administration's mandatory date for desegregation.

The wife of Stokely Carmichael, former civil rights leader, tells reporters that her husband has resigned as prime minister and as a member of the Black Panther party.

July 7—Attorney General John Mitchell announces that the government has filed 2 desegregation suits—one in Illinois and one in South Carolina—and has cut off financial aid to 3 Southern school districts.

July 22—The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (S.N.C.C.) announces that H. Rap Brown has been renamed as chairman; the word "non-violent" has been dropped from its title, and the organization will now be known as the Student National Coordinating Committee.

After a night of Negro rioting triggered by an interracial neighborhood fight, police and National Guard units remain on duty in Columbus, Ohio.

Pennsylvania Governor Raymond P. Shafer orders the National Guard to York, as racial violence continues.

July 23—In Chicago, the Board of Education announces a plan to end faculty segregation in the public schools; it received

a warning on July 9 from the federal Department of Justice.

A federal court judge rules that Houston, Texas, can maintain a freedom-of-choice desegregation plan in the 1969-1970 academic year but must change its districts by September, 1970.

July 24—All National Guardsmen leave Columbus, Ohio, after racial violence subsides.

## Economy

July 30—A price rise averaging 4.8 per cent effective August 6 is announced by U.S. Steel. Other steel companies are expected to announce similar increases.

A new offering of U.S. Treasury notes carries an interest rate of 7.82 per cent, the highest since 1859.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Republic of China; U.S.S.R.*)

July 3—In a 1-sentence communiqué, the Department of State reveals that the ban on credit sales of arms to Peru and Ecuador is being lifted.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers disbands the department's Policy Planning Council and establishes a new "planning and coordination staff" of some 12 to 20 foreign policy specialists. The staff will be headed by career officer William I. Cargo.

The State Department reveals that it has asked the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan about a reported Nationalist Chinese paramilitary force attack against mainland China yesterday.

July 6—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller returns to New York after his 4th and last fact-finding trip to Latin America for President Richard Nixon.

July 9—Diplomatic sources cited by *The New York Times* disclose that the U.S. is considering shipping 100 new Patton tanks to Turkey and approving Turkey's release to Pakistan of 100 old tanks received by Turkey through the U.S. military aid program.

July 10—The Department of State confirms

that the U.S. signed a secret defense pact with Thailand in 1965; it is described as a "military contingency plan" within the framework of previous U.S. commitments to Thailand.

July 14—The Department of Commerce releases a report showing that the U.S. had a surplus of a little over \$18.2 million in trade with East European nations in 1968; the proportion of U.S. trade with Communist countries remained 0.6 per cent, the same figure as 1967.

July 17—The *Congressional Record* reports an exchange of notes between the State Department and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.); the State Department has informed the Senator that it has established new rules allowing aliens who have been barred from the U.S. for political reasons to pass through the U.S. en route to other countries.

July 21—The State Department announces that after a 19-year-old trade and travel ban, scholars, students, scientists, doctors and newsmen will be allowed to travel to mainland China. Citizens traveling abroad will be allowed to bring home up to \$100 in goods produced in Communist China.

July 22—President Richard Nixon begins a 12-day trip to Asia, Rumania and England.

State Department officials say that the U.S. has accepted in principle a Soviet proposal for opening a Soviet consulate in San Francisco and a U.S. consulate in Leningrad.

July 23—Officials in the State Department say there has been a delay in authorizing American travel in mainland China.

July 25—In Manila, the President declares that the U.S. plans to redesign and reduce its military commitments in Asia.

July 28—In Bangkok, President Nixon declares that the "U.S. will stand proudly with Thailand against those who might threaten it from abroad or within." Thailand is the President's 3d stop in his 5-nation Asian tour: he has already visited the Philippines and Indonesia, and will

travel to India and Pakistan before visiting Rumania and Great Britain on his way back to Washington.

July 30—President Nixon visits briefly in South Vietnam, conferring with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and talking with U.S. troops.

A reply to Japanese demands for return of the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, is delivered by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesmen term the reply "tough."

July 31—President Nixon confers in New Delhi with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

## Government

July 2—The Internal Revenue Service declares that it is going to make a special audit of the income tax returns of some 10,000 doctors who have received more than \$25,000 yearly in Medicare and Medicaid payments.

July 5—It is reported by *The New York Times* that the administration has urged a slowdown until mid-July in legislative consideration of a mine-safety bill "to perfect forecasts of the burden of cost" to be imposed on the coal industry.

July 9—In an economy move, President Nixon orders a reduction of 5,100 in the number of government civilian employees abroad, and the withdrawal of 14,900 military men from overseas bases outside the war area.

July 10—The Wisconsin Assembly's election committee votes 5 to 2 against a proposal for a constitutional convention in the United States; despite the committee's failure to recommend the proposal, it goes to the floor of the Assembly for action. Thirty-three states—1 less than the required 2/3 of the states—have passed resolutions asking Congress to convene a constitutional convention to permit an amendment to allow 1 house of a bicameral state legislature to be apportioned on a basis other than population. The resolutions are aimed at the 1-man, 1-vote ruling of the Supreme Court.



July 11—The administration asks Congress to pass a bill permitting the imprisonment of a suspect in a federal criminal case for up to 60 days without bail if a judge finds "substantial probability" that the defendant is guilty and if he determines after a hearing that the release of the suspect would constitute a danger to the community.

The U.S. court of appeals for the first circuit overturns the conviction of Dr. Benjamin Spock and 3 others who were convicted of conspiring to counsel evasion of the draft in 1968. A new trial is ordered for the Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr., and Mitchell Goodman, because of an "error" in submitting 10 special questions to the jury.

July 14—The President urges a nation-wide campaign against narcotics abuse and asks Congress for a bill to allow federal agents with warrants to enter residences unannounced; he requests heavier penalties for violations of federal drug laws.

July 15—The Department of Justice reopens the case against Robert Baker, secretary to the Senate's Democratic majority between 1956 and 1963. Baker was convicted in 1967 on criminal charges and is still appealing; the new suit is a civil action with a broader scope.

July 17—At the request of Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), the Senate hears secret data about the antiballistic missile issue in closed session. This is the 4th closed Senate session since World War II.

July 18—The President urges a substantial increase in federal support for family planning assistance.

July 19—The American Home Products Corporation of New York, a major pharmaceutical company, admits that it ordered an investigation of a Senate aide who had participated in drafting legislation that would regulate the drug industry.

July 22—President Nixon orders the administration to reduce expenditures by \$3.5 billion, because of the increase in uncontrollable commitments in certain departments.

July 28—It is reported in Washington that the Treasury collected \$2.2 billion more than had been estimated in personal income taxes in fiscal 1969; the fiscal 1969 budget surplus totals \$3.1 billion.

The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence recommends that in order to curb violence in America, the federal government and the states should confiscate 90 per cent of the 24 million handguns (pistols and revolvers) owned by private citizens. Federal minimum standards for restrictive state legislation are urged.

## **Labor**

July 1—After settlement of the 14-week strike of Negro workers at the State Medical College Hospital in Charleston, South Carolina, workers begin to return to work. Charleston County Hospital workers who struck in sympathy find themselves without jobs.

Agreement is reached between the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots and the Tanker Service Committee to end the 16-day-old strike of deck officers against the operators of 65 American-flag tankers.

July 3—Ralph David Abernathy, leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, is released from jail; he was arrested on June 21 in Charleston on charges of inciting to riot as a result of his role in supporting striking hospital workers there. He expresses confidence that accord on the remainder of the dispute is imminent. The County Hospital will take back only 37 of the 69 workers who left their jobs to support the striking Medical College Hospital workers.

July 13—The strike of County Hospital workers in South Carolina continues.

July 18—Settlement is reached in the 113-day strike at Charleston County Hospital. 42 of the 65 workers will return to work on Tuesday; an effort will be made to employ the remainder within the next three months.

## Military

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

July 11—The Department of Defense reveals that open air tests of poison gases have been conducted at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland; and Fort McLellan, Alabama. More tests are being planned.

U.S. Navy reconnaissance planes fly over Soviet warships off the Florida coast; the ships are bound for Cuba, on what is described by the Soviet Union as a friendly visit.

July 15—Under congressional pressure, the Army suspends open-air tests of nerve gases at the Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland.

July 16—The Army suspends tests of poison gases in the open air at Fort McLellan, Alabama.

July 18—The *Wall Street Journal* published today reports that 25 Americans were injured after an accidental discharge of nerve gas stored at a U.S. depot on Okinawa. *The New York Times* cites "knowledgeable sources" who say that artillery shells and bombs filled with lethal nerve gas have been stored at major U.S. military bases overseas for years; such poison gases are said to be stored in West Germany, on Okinawa, and possibly in South Korea. (See also *West Germany*.)

July 19—Members of a panel to study operations of the Department of Defense are named; companies doing business with the Department of Defense are heavily represented on the panel, which is to study the Pentagon's management, research, procurement and decision-making machinery.

July 22—The Defense Department admits that the U.S. has shipped poison gas munitions to U.S. forces overseas; it announces that all such munitions will be removed from Okinawa.

## Politics

July 24—Senator Eugene McCarthy (D., Minn.) states that he will not seek reelection to the Senate from Minnesota or from any other state on any ticket.

July 25—After pleading guilty in a court

hearing on a charge of leaving the scene of a fatal automobile accident July 18, Massachusetts Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.) appears on national television. He describes the accident in which his passenger was killed; terms his failure to report the accident "indefensible"; and asks his constituents to advise him on whether to resign his Senate seat.

July 30—Kennedy announces that he will remain in the Senate and keep his post as assistant majority leader. He states that he hopes to be a candidate for reelection to the Senate in 1970 and, if reelected, will "serve out his entire six-year term." The statement apparently indicates Kennedy's decision not to seek a presidential nomination in 1972.

## Science and Space

(See *Intl, Space Exploration*)

### VATICAN

July 30—A first visit to Africa by a reigning Pope begins as Paul VI leaves for Uganda.

## VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

### VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

July 4—The publisher of an English-language daily newspaper in Saigon is sentenced to a 5-year term in prison for "actions detrimental to the national order." This follows the closing of 36 newspapers by the government in the past year. A U.S. study team report printed in the June 17, 1969, *Congressional Record*, lists many thousands of persons similarly arrested for urging a coalition government.

July 21—In a speech to government pacification trainees, President Nguyen Van Thieu says that it will be at least two years before national elections can be set up to include the Vietcong.

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